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ANTITRUST
Merger of Leading Wholesale Distributors
Enjoined Pending FTC Review
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the
Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) motion for injunctive relief pending
administrative review against the proposed merger of four leading
wholesale drug distributors, under the Federal Trade Commission Act §
13, 15 U.S.C.A. § 53(b). 1
Defendants, four of the largest wholesale drug distributors in the
United States,2 responding to industry trends in wholesale drug sales,
publicly announced in 1997 plans to merge 3 After learning ofthe planned
merger, the FTC commenced anti-trust proceedings in early 1998 under
the authority of the Federal Trade Commission Act, § 13.4 The same year,
the FTC brought a motion in district court to enjoin defendants' proposed
merger pending FTC administrative review. 5
The district court upheld plaintiff s motion when it found plaintiff
would likely succeed on a claim under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18.6 In its analysis, the court considered the effect of the
proposed merger on the relevant wholesale market. The court concluded
were the proposed merger was to occur, the number of national wholesale
distributors would be reduced to two corporations. 8 Furthermore, the
court found there would be substantial antitrust implications because the
two corporations would control over eighty percent of the relevant
wholesale market. 9 Therefore, the court granted the FTC's motion
requesting an injunction against defendants' merger, pending a full
hearing by FTC.' 0 FederalTrade Commission v. CardinalHealth, 12 F.
Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C.July 31, 1998).

'Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d 34,6S (D.D.C. 1993).

2

d at 36.

'Id
4 at 42-43.

Id at 44.

5

1d.
CardinalHealth,12 F. Supp. 2d at 66.

6

71d.
8
1d.
9

1d. at 67.

'Id. at 6S.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Promotion of Off-Label Uses for Prescription
Drugs Protected by First Amendment
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) restrictions of drug manufacturers'
promotions of prescription drug off-label uses at educational seminars
violated the commercial speech provisions of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution."
In 1996, the FDA issued policies in its Guidance Documents
imposing restrictions on drug manufacturers regarding the distribution of
medical texts and peer-reviewed journal articles at Continuing Medical
Education seminars (CME's).' 2 Specifically, the Guidance Documents
stated manufacturers' promotions of off-label uses for prescription drugs
and devices would constitute misbranding, a violation punishable under
the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act.' 3 Plaintiff, a nonprofit public interest
law and policy center, sued to enjoin the FDA and the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) from enforcing the policies under the
theory it violated manufacturers' First Amendment rights of free speech. 14
The district court found drug manufacturers' promotions of off-label
uses for prescription drugs through the distribution of text and journal
reprints at CMEE's was commercial speech, not conduct, under the First
Amendment. 5 The court reasoned pharmaceutical manufacturers would
be likely to use and disseminate research studies promoting off-label uses
for their products rather than research studies advising against a particular
off-label use.' 6 Additionally, the research promoting the off-label use
would be more likely to reach physicians.'7 Thus, the court found a
potential to harm and mislead existed, which is the reason commercial
speech is held to a less exacting standard.' 8 Furthermore, the court found,
although the FDA had a substantial interest in preventing the promotion
"Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74-75 (D.D.C. 1998).

'2Id at 54.
13Id at 55.

'41d at 59; (see U.S. Const. Amend I).
151d. at 65; (see U.S. Const. Amend I).
'6Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 65.

"Id.
'81d.
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of off-label uses of prescription drug and devices by manufacturers, the
Guidance Documents were more restrictive than necessary to serve that
interest under the test set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corporationv. PublicService Commission ofNew York. 9 Therefore, the
court held the FDA's Guidance Documents unconstitutionally restricted
drug manufacturers' right to commercial speech.2" Accordingly, the court
granted plaintiff' motion.2 ' Washington Legal Foundationv. Friedman,
13 F. Supp. 2d 51(D.D.C. 1998).

Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act Violates Takings Clause
The Supreme Court of the United States found the Coal Industry Retiree
Health Benefit Act (Act), as it applied to a former coal operator, Eastern
Enterprises (Eastern), constituted an unlawful taking under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.22
The Act provided medical benefits to coal workers and their
dependents through premiums assessed against any coal operators who
had previouslybeen required to make contributions under an earlier health
benefit plan.23 Plaintiff left the coal industry in 1965 and assigned all its
rights and obligations pertaining to coal mining to a subsidiary. 4
However, under the Act's allocation scheme, plaintiff assumed the
responsibility for premiums for over 1,000 retired miners who had been
employed with the company before 1966.25 Because of this allocation
scheme, plaintiff filed suit alleging the Act violated its due process
rights
26
Amendment.
Fifth
the
of
violation
in
taking
a
constituted
and
The court addressed plaintiffs Fifth Amendment claim that the Act
violated the takings clause by examining three factors: the economic
impact on plaintiff, the interference with plaintiffs investment-backed

191d. at 71 (citing Central Hudson Gas &Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980)).
2Id.

2Wid. at 74.
'Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2153 (1998) (plurality opinion).
2'Id. at 2142.
24
d. at 2143.

7Id.
2

6Id.; (see U.S. Const. Amend V).
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expectations and, finally, the character of the government action. 27 First,
the court found the economic impact on plaintiffto be substantial because
it imposed a severe, retroactive burden, which would cost plaintiff
between 50 and 100 million dollars. 28 Next, the court determined the
degree of impact the Act would impose upon plaintiffs reasonable
investment-backed expectations. 9 Because the Act's scope extended
thirty years into the past by imposing a burden based upon plaintiffs
activities at that time and did not relate to any commitment or injury
assumed by plaintiff, the court found the act substantially interfered with
plaintiff's reasonable investment-backed expectations.30
Finally, the court held the government action in seeking to assure
health care for retired miners did not outweigh the severe economic
impact and the grave interference upon reasonable investment-backed
expectations.31 Consequently, the court held the Act constituted an
unlawful takings in violation of the Fifth Amendment.32 Eastern
Enterprisesv. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998) (pluralityopinion).

HIV Testing of Arrestee Constitutional
The Supreme Court of Georgia held arrestees' rights of privacy, equal
protection rights, and Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by
compelling arrestees to submit blood samples for human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) testing pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-15(b). 33
The statute permitted a victim of a crime, who faced significant exposure
to HIV during commission of the crime, to require the arrestee to submit
34
a blood sample for HIV testing upon arrest.
On October 3, 1997, arresting officers of the Waycross Police
Department attempted to arrest defendant.35 In the course of the arrest,

27

Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2146.
1d. at 2149.
29
1d. at 2151.
28

3°Od.
id. at 2153.
3
3

1Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2153.
Adams v. State, 498 S.E.2d 268, 269 (Ga. 1998).
4

33

3 1d.

3SId. at 269.
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defendant attacked the officers. 36 During the altercation, blood seeped
from a previous wound on defendant's hand through a bandage.
37
Meanwhile, one of the officers cut his finger while subduing defendant.
The officer later testified his bleeding finger touched defendant's wound,
but he was uncertain whether his blood came into contact with
defendant's. 38 Defendant did not exhibit any physical indications of
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).39 The State filed a motion
to compel defendant to submit a blood sample for HIV testing, which the
trial court granted.4' Defendant requested a stay pending appeal, which
was denied.41
The first issue addressed by the court was whether OCGA § 17-1015(b) which permitted the State to obtain a sample, violated the Fourth
Amendment ofthe United States Constitution.42 The court held the statute
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 43 The court began its analysis by
finding the obtaining of blood samples a bodily intrusion, and thus, a
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.4" However, the court
noted, the Fourth Amendment only bans "unreasonable" searches and
seizures. 45 Reasonableness, the court continued, is measured through a
determination of probable cause, but probable cause determinations can
be found impracticable when situations exceed the ordinary needs of law
enforcement.46 The court applied a balancing test to determine whether
the government's need to conduct the search outweighed the interests of
the individual. 47 The court found the needs of the government to promote
public health and safety by slowing the spread of HIV were significant
and substantial, while the intrusion to the individual was minimal." In
addition, the results of the test were excluded from use against the arrestee

36

1d.

37Id. at 270.
HAdams, 498 S.E.2d at 270.

39Id.
40
411d.

1d.

42

Id.; (see U.S. Const. Amend IV).

43

A dams, 498 S.E.2d at 271.
4id.
45

1d.; (see U.S. Const. Amend IV).

4A dams, 498 S.E.2d at 271.
47

1d.
48Id.
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in any criminal proceeding.4 9 Therefore, the interests of the government
outweighed those of the individual."
The second issue addressed by the court was whether OCGA § 1710-15(b) violated an individual's right of privacy.5' In holding OCGA §
17-10-15(b) violated the right of privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the court again focused on the government's interest in
protecting the public from the spread of HIV. 2 The court found the
state's interest compelling and the test conducted in the least intrusive
manner.5 3 Noting the results were only available to the victim and public
health authorities, the court concluded there was no violation4 of the
individual's right of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment.1
In resolving the third issue regarding an individual's equal protection
rights, the court found OCGA § 17-10-15(b) did not infringe upon a
fundamental right or a suspect class." Furthermore, the court found a
rational relationship existed between the government's interest in slowing
the spread of HIV and the likely cause of HIV infection in cases in which
a risk of exchange of bodily fluids during commission of a criminal
offense existed. 6 The court affirmed the motion compelling arrestee to
submit to testing. Adams v. State, 498 S.E.2d 268 (Ga. 1998).

CONTRACTS
Covenant Not to Compete Unenforceable
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted
summary judgment against plaintiff medical graft producer's breach of
contract claim for breach of covenant not to compete in the sale of

49

1d. at 272.
50Id.
5'Adams, 498 S.E.2d at 272.

521d.
53Id.

541d.
55Id.
'6Adams, 498 S.E.2d at 272 (citing People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1992); Benton
v. State, 461 S.E.2d 202 (Ga. 1995)).
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vascular graft products.
The court held the covenant was
unenforceable. 8
Plaintiffhad been contractually involved with defendant distribution
company for many years.5 9 Defendant was the exclusive distributor for
plaintiffs products.6 On December 6,1994, a contract had been executed
between the parties granting defendant exclusive rights to sole distribution
of plaintiffs products. Included in the contract was a covenant not to
compete clause.62 The substance of the clause barred defendant from
conducting any sales of products or services for the purpose ofcompeting
with plaintiff. On December 31, 1996, the contract between the parties
was terminated when plaintiff decided against renewal.6 3 In August of
1996, three executives of defendant company began to explore the
possibilities of starting a separate company for the purpose of selling graft
products. 64 The three executives incorporated their new company, Orion
Medical, Inc. (Orion) in September 1996,65 but they remained employees
of defendant.66 The three executives decided the covenant not to compete
between defendant and plaintiff would not be breached by Orion's
operations. 67
The issue before the court was whether sales by Orion in direct
6
competition with plaintiff violated the parties' covenant not to compete.
The court held the covenant unenforceable. 69 The court applied New
Jersey law governing contracts, which held covenants not to compete
could only be enforced ifreasonable.70 Three factors, the court concluded,
determined reasonableness. 71 First, the covenant must be necessary to
protect bothparties' legitimate interests. 72 Second, the covenant could not

57Meadox Med., Inc. v. Life Sys., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (D.NJ. 1998).
58
1rd.

ssId"
60Id.
61
1d.
'Meadox, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
1d.
6'Id. at 551.
6id.
63

61id
6'Meadox, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 55 1.
631d.
69
1d. at 554.
70
1d. at 552 (citing Solari Industries, Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53 (1970)).

711d.

72Meadox, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 552.

646
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cause undue hardship to the former employee. 3 Third, the covenant must
be acceptable under public policy reasons. 74 Plaintiff had asserted two
interests to be protected. 75 First, plaintiff asserted its confidential pricing
information and strategies, and customer relationships needed protection.76
Second, plaintiff asserted defendant violated proprietary information to
breach the covenant.77
The court found defendant's customer-base to be independent of the
contract with plaintiff.78 Defendant, the court continued, developed its
own customer contacts from which it sold plaintiffs products. 79 Also, the
court found the language of the contract between the parties supported that
interpretation." Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment
was granted.8 Meadox Medicals, Inc., v. Life Sys., 3 F. Supp. 2d 549
(D.NJ.1998).

DAMAGES
Maintenance of Life Support Against Wishes
of Next-of-Kin Medical Battery
The Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, held a daughter, whose
father received medical treatment without the consent of next of kin,
adequately stated a claim for medical battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.82 Her father was maintained on life support despite
stipulations to 3the contrary in a living will, as well as the expressed wishes
8

of his family.

4
Plaintiffs father sought treatment in hospital's emergency room.1
Plaintiffs mother granted consent for cardiac tests, including an

73

'Id.

'41d. (citing A.T. Hudson & Co. v. Donovan, 524 A.2d 412 (1987)).
75
1d.

6
'7
d.

"Meadox,
78

3 F. Supp. 2d at 552.

1d. at 553.

79

1d.
80 d.
8:1d.

2
8'3Gragg v. Calandra, 696 N.E. 1282, 1290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).

d.

4MId.
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angiogram, on behalf ofplaintiffs father.85 During cardiac catherization,
plaintiffs father suffered cardiac arrest, rendering him comatose and
making his survival impossible.8 6 Nevertheless, defendant physician
performed open-heart surgery on plaintiff s father during which the father
sustained irreversible brain damage requiring life support.? Plaintiff
alleged defendant performed the open-heart surgery without first obtaining
the consent of the next-of-kin.88 Plaintiff also alleged the hospital
maintained her father on life-support despite the wishes of the next of kin
and her father's living will, which declined life-sustaining measures."
The appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Count I
against defendant hospital, which stated a claim under the Family Expense
Act (FEA).9' The trial court concluded the death of the patient's spouse
and plaintiff's mother abated any cause of action under the FEA, but the
appellate court held recovery survived the death of the spouse when
recovery rested on liability and was not a statutory creation.9 The court
agreed with plaintiffs argument the cause of action was battery, not
malpractice as defendant hospital maintained9 ' because there were no
allegations of deviations from proper medical standards. 93 The court
further reasoned the hospital could be held vicariously liable for the
intentional torts ofphysicians, who used the hospital's facilities to provide
care.94 The court dismissed Count II for failure to state a claim under the
Consumer Fraud Act because plaintiff failed to show a connection
between the potential injuries and alleged misrepresentations in the
hospital's advertising. 95
The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of claims of intentional
infliction ofemotional distress. 6 The court reasoned defendant's repeated
accusations plaintiff and patient's wife were trying to kill the patient did
amount to extreme and outrageous conduct because defendant knew
"Id.
5Id.at 1284.
"Gragg, 696 N.E.2d at 1285.
MId.

"Id.
90Id. at 1286; (see 750 ILL. Comp. STAT. 65/15 (West 1996)).
91
1d.
92
Gragg,696 N.E.2d
93

at 1286-87.

Id. at 1287-88.

94Id.
95

1d. at 1288; (see 750 ILL. COmp. STAT. 65/15
96Gragg, 696 N.E.2d at 1290.

(West 1996)).
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plaintiff and patient's wife were susceptible to emotional stress, and
maintenance of life-support would negatively impact their emotional
states.97 Thus, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
with directions. 98 Gragg v. Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282 (71. App. Ct.
1998).

DISABILITY
Pregnancy-Related Disorders May Qualify As a Disability
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division held pregnancy may qualify as a disability under the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) when abnormal conditions
related to pregnancy substantially affect major life activities.99
Plaintiff, a probationary data entry operator with the Chicago Police
Department, suffered from back pain, stomach pain, and swelling limiting
her ability to stand.'00 Plaintiff's supervisor forced her to do heavy labor
despite physician's orders plaintiff engage in light work only.'"1 Noting
plaintiff "could not work quickly enough" and had missed five days of
work in six months, the supervisor fired her.' Plaintiff subsequently
delivered two months prematurely. 103
In determining whether complications related to pregnancy may be
considered a disorder under the ADA, the court ultimately applied
Hernandez v. Hartford.'°4 The Hernandez decision relied on Dorland's

Medical Dictionary, The American Medical Association's Council on
Scientific Affairs, and the Journalof the American Medical Association

in distinguishing normal complications of pregnancy from "physiological
disorders."' 5 Expert testimony agreed a woman undergoing a normal
97

Id.
'8id.
"Gabriel v. City of Chicago, 9 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. 111. 1998); see Americans With
Disabilities Act, § 2, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (1990).
'°Id. at 976.

1011d.

' 02 d at 977.
03
1d.

'"Gabriel,9 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (citing Hernandez v. Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 130-31

(D. Corn 1997)).
losId.
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pregnancy should be able to carry out her employment responsibilities
until the onset of labor." 6 However, a complication, such as premature
labor, qualified as a physiological disorder because it was an "abnormal
functioning of the body."'0 7 The court held plaintiff produced sufficient
evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude10she
suffered an impairment
3
affecting the major life activity of standing.
Accordingly, the court denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment.'0 9 Gabrielv. City of Chgo., 9 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D.Ill. 1998).

Objective Standard Determines Adverse
Employment Action under ADA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held an
objective standard should apply to considerations of factors in adverse
employment actions under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA)." 0
After plaintiff teacher told defendant school district he was human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive, the school district proposed
transferring him from apsycho-education classroom reserved for students
with severe behavioral problems to an interrelated classroom for students
with mild disorders.' The school district had three classroom levels for
students with special needs." 2 The psycho-education classroom was
reserved for students with severe behavioral disorders." 3 Students in the
psycho-education classroom were often aggressive and had been known
to bite.1 4 Plaintiff had a Georgia certificate in psycho-educational
teaching and was personally devoted to teaching in a psycho-education
classroom." 5 When the school board attempted to transfer him to an
interrelated classroom, the plaintiffsought a permanent injunction barring
the transfer.' 6 Plaintiff claimed protection under the ADA on the basis of
6
'°
Id.
'"Id. at 982.
"&Gabriel,9 F. Supp. 2d at 983.
"'Doe v. Dekalb County School Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1454 (1Ith Cir. 1998).
"Id. at 1443.
121d.
13Id.
114

Id. at 1444.
"sDoe, 145 F.3d at 1444.
16Id.
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his I-IV status and because he would suffer an adverse employment action
bybeing transferred." 7 The district court granted the plaintiffa permanent
injunction and required8 the School Board to reinstate him in the psycho'
education classroom. 1
The appellate court found the district court failed to make any factual
findings to assist the appellate court's review." 9 The appellate court,
therefore, remanded the case back to the district court for application of
the tests adopted by the appellate court. 20 The main issue before the
appellate court was whether an adverse employment action should be
based on an objective or subjective analysis.' The court held it should
be based on a reasonable person, objective analysis.' 2 Under that
analysis, the court found plaintiffs personal devotion to teaching in a
psychoeducation classroom could not be taken into account. Rather the
court should have examined issues such as whether completing ten credit
hours over three years to receive certification in interrelated teaching was
adverse. m' After providing the test, the appellate court vacated the
injunction and remanded the case. 124 Doe v. DeKalb Cty. School Dist.,
145 F.3d 1441 (1ith Cir. 1998)

Transient Condition May Be Construed
As Disability Under ADA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held workers'
impairment could meet the substantially limiting requirement of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) even before permanent disability
ratings had been issue by treating physicians. 25 The court further
concluded workers were not judicially estopped from pursuing ADA
claims because they had applied for and received benefits under the

1171d. at 1444-45.
'Id. at 1445.
"Id.
at 1446.
'20Doe, 145 F.3d at 1446, 1454.
21
' 1d. at 1447.
1'Id. at 1448-49.

'23id. at 1452.
'241d. at 1454.
'"sAldrich v. Boeing Co. 146 F.3d 1265, 1267 (10th Cir. 1998).
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employer's
private disability plan and state Worker's Compensation
126
law.
Plaintiff worked for defendant as an assembly line worker for
approximately four years before receiving a diagnosis of flexor tendon
tenosynovitis.127 Plaintiff was restricted from engaging in numerous
activities, including continuous grasping, pushing, or pulling. 23 Plaintiff
later received a permanent partial impairment rating of fifteen percent
from his orthopedic surgeon. 2 9 Prior to receiving a permanent disability
rating, defendant terminated him. 30
Defendant contended, absent a permanent disability rating, it had no
duty to accommodate the plaintiff under the ADA.13 1 The court rejected
defendant's argument holding determinations of disability status under the
ADA should be made on a case-by-case basis, and "are not susceptible to
perse rules.' 3' The court also noted the EEOC guidelines "clearly state
that an impairment need not be permanent in order to rise to the level of
a disability."' 133 The court further maintained the evidence was clearly
sufficient to establish that plaintiffs condition was "substantially
limiting."'134 Questions of material fact remained, however, regarding
whether plaintiffwas "otherwise qualified," so that he could have carried
out his duties with reasonable accommodations. 35
The court also addressed whether plaintiff was judicially estopped
from asserting an ADA claim, although he was receiving private disability
benefits as well as worker's compensation benefits. 36 The court reasoned
because such benefits were dispersed regardless of ability to perform ajob
with reasonable accommodations, claims for private disability benefits
were not necessarily inconsistent with an ADA claim. 37 Aldrich v.
Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998).

1226ld.
1d
I
181d.
'3 0Aldrich, 146 F.3d at 1267.
'Id. at 1270.
'321d.

1331d.
1

34d. at 1272.
'Aldrich, 146 F.3d at 1272.

'36
1d. at 1268.
137 d.

652
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Inability to Work with Reasonable
Accommodation No Bar to ADA Suit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held former
employees who become disabled, and therefore, unable to work with
reasonable accommodation, reserve the right to sue under Title I of the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) for discrimination relating to
their fringe benefits. 38 The third circuit departed from
holdings in the
9
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, thus creating a split.1
Plaintiff alleged discrimination in violation of the ADA due to a
disparity in health benefits offered through defendant's corporate
employee health plan. 14' The health plan provided for physical disability
benefits until the age of sixty-five, but provided mental health benefits for
only two years, unless the beneficiary was hospitalized. 14 1 Plaintiff sued
under Title I and Title III of the ADA. 142 The initial inquiry before the
court was whether a plaintiff who is disabled and unable to work, even
143
with reasonable accommodation, could sue under Title I of the ADA.
Plaintiff acknowledged she was unable to work due to mental illness and
because of this sought the denied benefits. 144 After reviewing both the
legislative intent behind the ADA and earlier appellate decisions, the court
held to afford disabled individuals with the full range of rights intended
under the ADA, an employee must be given the right to sue for
discrimination in fringe benefits, even if they are disabled and unable to
work.' 4
Consequently, the court held former employees who
subsequently become disabled reserve the right to sue
under Title I of the
46
ADA for discrimination in their disability benefits.1
After affording plaintiff standing to sustain an action under Title I of
the ADA, the court then reviewed whether the facts of the case supported

...
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 603 (3rd Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 67
U.S.L.W. 3436 (Jan. 11, 1999).

"91d. at 607.

14id. at 603.
1411d. at 603-04.
142 d. at 604.
143Ford, 145 F.3d at 604.

'441d. at 605.
'Id at 608.
'Id.
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a finding of discrimination. 147 The court concluded because the benefits
offered to plaintiff were the same benefits offered to all employees, the
offer of different benefits for various disabilities was irrelevant to a claim
of discrimination.14 8 Consequently, the court dismissed plaintiff's claim
of discrimination under Title I of the ADA.'4 9 Finally, the court rejected
the plaintiffs argument Title HI included services such as provision of
mental health benefits. 5 ° Holding terms and conditions of employment
were covered under Title I, and not Title III of the ADA, the court
dismissed the claim of discrimination under Title 1. 11 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a
claim.' 5 2 Fordv. Schering-PlougliCorp., 145 F.3d 601(3rd Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 67 US.L. WV 3436, (Jan.11, 1999).

Disability Under ADA Includes Asymptomatic HIV
The Supreme Court of the United States broadened the definition of
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to include
asymptomatic human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive
individuals.153 In doing so, the court held reproduction constitutes a major
life activity such that its limitation may constitute a disability. "4
Furthermore, the court adhered to previous rulings in holding individual
determinations are necessary in deciding whether the individual plaintiff
life activity due to a disability such as
was limited in a major
55
iIV.1
asymptomatic
Plaintiffwas a patient ofdefendant dentist.'56 Plaintiffhad informed
defendant ofherBEIV positive status afterbeing examined by defendant."
Plaintiff was informed she would need a filling.5 3 However, defendant
1471Id.

14SFord, 145 F.3d at 608-09.
1491d. at 614.
"Old. at 613.
'id. at 614.
152Id.
"Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct 2196, 2207 (1998).
"4Id. at 2205.
'5sId. at 2207.
6
Id. at 2201.
157 Id.
ISBragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201.
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refused to fill her cavity in his dental office due to plaintiffs infectious
status. 159 Alternatively, defendant offered to fill plaintiffs cavity at a
hospital at no extra charge for dental services.1 60 Plaintiff was, however,
required to pay the cost of the hospital services. 6 ' Instead of accepting
defendant's proposal,
plaintiff sued claiming discrimination in violation
162
of the ADA.
The first issue before the court was whether plaintiff was disabled
under the definition of the ADA.1 63 The ADA requires plaintiffs to prove
disabilities that substantially limit major life activities.'" The major life
165
activity plaintiff relied upon to state her claim was reproduction.
Consequently, the Court reviewed whether reproduction could constitute
a major life activity for purposes of the ADA.166 Because the Court found
reproduction was central to life itself, the court concluded reproduction
could constitute a major life activity under the ADA. 67
The next issue the court addressed was whether reproduction
constituted a major life activity to plaintiff.168 The court relied upon
testimony from the plaintiff, which established she had decided not to
reproduce after testingpositive forHIV.169 Additionally, expert testimony
established the risks associated with reproduction, including transmitting
the disease to sexual partners and to offspring. 70
' The court also examined
the legislative intent and previous judicial holdings construing the
definition of disability under the ADA.' 7 1 Based upon this evidence, the
court concluded the inherent risks associated with HIV, even
asymptomatic infection, were sufficiently severe
to constitute a substantial
72
limitation on a major life activity of plaintiff.

1591d.

61
'162Id.
1d"

63
' Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201.
'"Id"

'Id.
'67Id. at 2205.
' 68Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206.
169Id.

1701d.

1711d. at 2207.

'I2d. at 2209.
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Finally, the court considered the standard to be used in assessing
whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health and safety of
others and, therefore, is not covered under the ADA.1' Defendant argued
the court should defer to the medical judgment of health care
practitioners.174 The court held defendant's decision should be reviewed
from an objective standard, evaluating the reasonableness of defendant's
decision based upon the medical evidence available to him at the time of
the decision.' 75 The court noted the lower court had placed too much
emphasis on the guidelines of the American Dental Association (ADA)
and Centers for Disease Control Dentistry Guidelines (CDC). 176 The
AmDA and CDC guidelines, the court explained, only recommended
precautions and did not assess the level ofrisk.177 The court remanded the
case for a further determination of whether plaintiff posed a direct
threat. 78 Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).

EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
Reliance on Pre-1979 Service Credit Hours Not Discriminatory
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
employers did not discriminate against female employees, who took
pregnancy or maternity leave before 1979, when service credit hours
were
179
used as a basis for granting pension plan enhancement programs.
Plaintiff's cause of action arose from a policy by defendant's
predecessor limiting service credit hours for maternity and pregnancy
leave."'0 The policy was instituted prior to passage of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA) in 1979.18 ' Under the policy, females taking
maternity and pregnancy leave were granted a maximum of thirty days

'73Bragdon,
118 S. Ct. at 2210.
74
1 d.

17Id
176Id

'77Id. at 2211.
'78Bragdon,l18 S. Ct. at 2213.
"'Ameritech Benefit Plan Comm. v. Foster-Hall, Nos. 97 C 1441, 97 C 2209 1998 WL
419483 at *10 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 1998).
" Id. at *2.
...
Id.at *1-2.
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service credit.18 2 Workers, who took a leave of absence related to any
other type of disability, were given an unlimited number of days of service
credit. 183 After the PDA became effective in 1979, defendant provided the
same service credit for pregnancy related leaves of absence as other
disability-related leaves of absence.184 In several pension plan
enhancement programs offered in 1993 and 1994 defendant relied on the
18
pre-1979 service credit plan for pregnancy or maternity related leave. 5
Plaintiffs argued defendant's reliance on the pre-1979 policy violated Title
VII, the Equal Pay Act, Employment Retirement Income and Securities
Act (ERISA), and other state law claims because participation in the
pension plans was based on an employee's number of days of service
credit.' 86
The court held the statute of limitations barred the Title VII claims
because defendant's current policy in determining retirement benefits did
' Although the reliance on net credited
not discriminate based on gender. 87
service dates could place female employees who took a pregnancy leave
prior to 1979 at a disadvantage, the court held the current policies did not
harm plaintiffs. 88 In a Title VII claim, the court noted, the statute of
limitations begins to run when the discriminatory act occurred.' 89 The
court rejected arguments the claim was timely because defendant's refusal
to grant retroactive service credit was evidence of discriminatory intent
and its reliance on the net credited service dates was a continuing violation
of Title VII.190 The court found the statute of limitations began to run
when the service credit dates were applied prior to 1979.91 Additionally,
the court denied the ERISA claim because reliance by a plan administrator
on a neutral seniority system placing reliance on policies implemented
prior to passage of the PDA was not a breach of fiduciary duty to the plan
93
participants. 192 The court granted defendant summary judgment.
182Id. at *1.
8

1 3Id.
4

Z8 Ameritech, 1998 WL 419483 at *1.
5
'I
61d. at *1-2.

"sId. at *2.

'87Id. at *9.

188Id.*3.
189Ameritech, 1998 WL 419483 at *34.
19Id. at *7.
1911d "

12Id. at *10.

193Id.
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Ameritech Benefit Plan Commission v. Foster-Hall,Nos. 97 C 1441, 97
C 2209, 1998 tVL_, 419483 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 1998).

EXPERT WITNESS
Speculative Expert Medical Testimony
Regarding Cause Inadmissible
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held speculative
testimony regarding
cause is inadmissible, even when offered by expert
19 4
witnesses.
Plaintifftruck driver sued defendant chemical company for negligent
exposure to chemical vapors, which occurred whenplaintiffassisted inthe
cleanup of a chemical spill following a delivery.'5 Plaintiffoffered expert
testimony from a physician, who concluded exposure to toluene during the
clean-up caused plaintiff to acquire reactive airways dysfunction
syndrome (RAfS). 96 The court concluded the physician's causal theory
lacked scientific basis and could be excluded because it lacked scientific
reliability. 197 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found plaintiff failed
to establish proximate cause.19' Plaintiff appealed.'
Evaluating plaintiffs claim, the court first noted the standard of'
review for the exclusion of expert testimony was abuse of discretion D
Next, the court reiterated the "relevant and reliable" standard for
admissibility of expert testimony from Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 20 t The reliability of expert testimony, the court
continued, is weighed by balancing:
(1) whether the expert's theory can be tested;
(2) whether the theory has been subject to peer review and publication;
"9Moorev. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269,279 (5th Cir. 1998) (en bane).
'Id. at 271-272.
'6Id. at 273.

'g'Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 ( 1993); FED. RL EVID.
702).

19

Id. at 272.
Moore, 151 F.3d at 272.
"Id. at 274 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997)).
201
1
2

1d. at 275.

658
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(3) the potential rate of error existence of standards and controls; and
(4) general acceptance by the scientific community.0 2
Finally, the court individually analyzed the assertions allegedly
supporting the expert physician's theory. 2 3 First, the physician's training,
expertise, examinations, and tests were inadmissible because the physician
4
did not establish those items aided him in determining causation.2
Second, the court held the conclusions of an article relied upon by the
physician were speculative. 20 5 Third, the material safety data sheet for the
spilled chemicals had limited value, because the expert was unaware of
20 6
the tests conducted in generating the data contained on the sheet.
Fourth, the temporal connection between exposure and injury was not
substantiated.20 7 Finally, the expert's theory that any irritant could cause
RADS lacked scientific support.208
Ultimately, the court found none of the Daubert factors used to
assess whether an opinion is based on sound scientific methodology was
met.209 The expert's theory had not been tested, was not subject to peer
review, the rate of error was not known, nor had the theory attained
general acceptance.210 Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that the analytical gap between the expert's causal theory and
scientific knowledge supporting that theory was too wide. 211 Accordingly,
the court upheld the judgment of the district court.21 Moore v. Ashland
Chemical,Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

2

'Id. (citing Daubert,509 U.S. at 593-95).
3
20
1d. at 277-279.
20
2 4Moore, 151 F.3d at 278.
0Sld.

2

06Id
Id
2°S1d. at 279.
207

2

°°Moore, 151 F.3d at 279.
Old.

21

211
212

1d.
1d.
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Expert Medical Testimony on Generally
Accepted Mental Disorder Admissible
The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One, held testimony
pertaining to disassociative identity disorder (DID) was admissible
213
because it passed the general acceptance test of Fiye v. UnitedStates.
Defendant had been convicted multiple times for crimes ranging from
burglary to sodomy.214 After his last conviction, defendant participated in
a sex offender treatment program, where he was diagnosed with DID.215
Individuals with DID, the court noted, possess a primary identity and a
number of alternate identities existing in a co-conscious state.216
Following release from the treatment program, defendant continued a
voluntary course of therapy. 217 After defendant's condition began
deteriorating, his therapist visited him at home to determine if he needed
hospitalization.2 8 Incidents arising from that visit led to charges of
indecent liberties and kidnapping following an attack on the therapist 9
In light of his DID diagnosis, defendant asserted insanity and
diminished capacity defenses for each charge. 0 After hearing expert
testimony from both the state and defendant, the trial court excluded
testimony relevant to DID on the grounds it was not generally accepted
and the court ruled it would not be helpful to the jury.21' Admissible
expert testimony, the court ruled, must satisfy both the Frye general
acceptance test and Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 7 02.222 The court
held the trial court erroneously excluded DID testimony by merging the
two inquiries in holding DID failed to satisfy Frye because research did
not indicate whether an individual with DID was insane.m2 Thus, the trial

2 3

" State v. Greene, 960 P.2d 980, 989-90 (W'Iash. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Frye v. United

States, 21
293
4 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
'd.
at 985.

2 15

1d.
216

1d. at 982-83.

217

1d. at 985.

2t8

Greene, 960 P.2d at 985.
1d.

219

=ZOId.
"mId.at 986.

2

nld.at 9 88.
' Greene, 960 P.2d at 988.
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court misapplied the Frye test. 224 The court held the relationship between
22S
DID and insanity was appropriately analyzed under a FRE 702 inquiry.
However, the question of DID's general acceptance was a separate
issue.226
On further review, the court first noted DID is a generally accepted
mental disorder. 227 Analyzing FRE 702, the court considered whether
DID was relevant to the legal defenses of insanity and diminished
capacity. 228 The court held evidence of DID was relevant to an insanity
defense for indecent liberties because testimony of the therapist/victim
tended to show defendant was legally insane. 2 9 Without expert testimony
the jury was unable to determine the extent to Which DID affected
defendant's sanity. 230 However, the court found DID was not relevant to
kidnapping because activity of defendant during the attack did not amount
to legal insanity.2 31 Next, the court determined DID testimony was
relevant to the diminished capacity defense for both charges because such
testimony could show defendant was unable to form the requisite mens
rea.23' Finally, the court found because defendant did not exhibit signs of
malingering or faking DID, testimony regarding DID would be reliable
and helpful to the jury. 33
Accordingly, the court reversed and
remanded.234 Washington v. Greene, 960 P.2d980 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).

2 4Id.

2-5Id.
226Id.
227 d. at 990.

22Greene, 960 P.2d at 990.
29Id. at 991-93.
' 01d. at 992.
2
aId at 993.
2
2Id. at 993-94.
2 3 Greene, 960 P.2d at 996-97.
4Id. at 997.
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FEDERAL DRUG ADMINISTRATION
FDA Lacks Jurisdiction to Regulate
Tobacco Sales and Limit Advertising
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Act) did not grant the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) the jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.?5
The FDA enacted a final rule "restricting the sale and distribution of
tobacco products to minors and limiting the advertising and promotion of
tobacco products." m6 Cigarette and smokeless tobacco manufacturers,
convenience store retailers, and advertisers challenged the FDA's
jurisdiction over tobacco products." The FDA claimed jurisdiction under
both the drug and device provisions of the Act.238 Tobacco products were
classified as "combination products" because they contained both the drug
nicotine, and the device that delivered nicotine to the body. 9 At the
FDA's discretion, tobacco products were ultimately regulated as
devices.240 The district court upheld the statutory authority of the FDA to
regulate tobacco
products as devices, but revoked the restrictions on
24 1
advertising.
On appeal, the court considered whether Congress intended to
delegate the jurisdiction to regulate tobacco to the FDA.242 First, the court
noted the FDA's claim of jurisdiction was based only on the literal
meaning ofthe definitions of drug and device in the Act.243 Examining the
definitions in light of the whole Act, the court held the FDA had
jurisdiction to regulate the sale, distribution, and use ofproducts, to assure
a reasonable degree of safety.244 However, based on the FDA's own
findings that tobacco products were unsafe, the court reasoned "it is
3'Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 153 F.3d 155, 176 (4th
Cir. 1998).
-"Id.at 159. (See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and

Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44, 396 (1996)).
371d.
238d.
9

23 d. at 160.
24

Brown, 153 F.3d at 160.
159.
1d. at 161-62.
243
2 1d. at 163.
"Id. at 164.
24
'Id. at
242
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impossible to create regulations which will provide a reasonable assurance
' Thus, the FDA could not comply with the statutory authority
of safety."245
for the regulation of tobacco products, it cited in its own argument.2 46 The
court found the FDA's need to maneuver around the obstacle created by
to exclude
the operative provision ofthe Act reflected congressional intent
47
tobacco products from the scope of the FDA's authority.
Furthermore, the court noted the FDA consistently disclaimed
jurisdiction of tobacco products under the Act.2 48 Twice, the court noted,
public health groups petitioned the FDA to regulate cigarettes, and under
both the drug and device provisions, the FDA concluded it lacked
jurisdiction.2 49 Finally, the court reviewed numerous federal statutes and
amendments regulating tobacco products and found that "Congress had
taken no steps to overturn the FDA's interpretation of the Act, and had no
jurisdiction over tobacco products." 5 ' The Court concluded the authority
to regulate tobacco products was found to rest in Congress's regulatory
scheme, not in the FDA. 25 ' Thus, the court reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment. 22 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Food & DrugAdmin., 153 F.3d. 155 (4th Cir. 1998).

Marketing Drug Not Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Drug FDA Approved
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held the
mere act of placing a drug on the market with standard package inserts
similar to those used for Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved
drugs did not rise to fraudulent misrepresentation the drug had FDA
approval. 3 The court also concluded such action failed a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion under theories predicated in the Lanham Act,254 of common law

... Brown, 153 F.3d at 163-64.
246Id.
2471d. at 167.
'4Id. at 168-70.
249d.

2"°Brown, 153 P.2d at 170-75 passim.
2 Id. at 175-76.

252Id.

2"Eli Lilly & Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 460,478 (D.N.J. 1998).
2"4See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), (h) and/or (i).
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fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and tortious interference vithbusiness
relationships.255
PlaintiffLilly filed an action against pharmaceutical companies Opos
and Roussel alleging defendants fraudulently obtained FDA approval for
a generic version of Lilly's antibiotic Ceclor. 6 In 1992, Opos sought
FDA approval by submitting the required Abbreviated Antibiotic Drug
Application (AADA) to the FDA. 57 From 1995 through 1996, Opos and
Roussel sold the active ingredient in Lilly's antibiotic throughout the
United States until the FDA initiated an investigation of defendant's
AADA precipitated by complaints about the drug. 2s The FDA detected
numerous inconsistencies in defendant's AADA, among them a failure to
manufacture the drug according to the process represented in the
AADA2' 9 Opos and Roussel recalled the drug stating there were
"inconsistencies" in its submission to the FDA.269 The FDA declared the
261
AADA contents false and misleading.
Asserting defendants' marketing of the drug constituted an implied
statement defendants lawfully obtained FDA approval,26 2 Lilly
commenced an action pursuant to the Lanham Act, 63 which "creates a
cause of action for any false description of a product ' '2"' [and] "for unfair
competition. ' 2" The Third Circuit held the complaint fatally defective
because the complaint failed to show any statement or representation by
the defendants the drug actually had FDA approval.2 66 Quoting the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Mylan Laboratoriesv. Matkari, the Third Circuit
held the defect could not be cured by contending the "very act of placing
a drug on the market with standard package inserts often used for FDAapproved drugs, somehow implies (falsely) that the drug had been

"S'EliLilly,23 F. Supp. 2d at 478-79, 481.

2-SId. at 466-67.
2'Id.at 468

2581d.
S9Id
'6Eli Lilly, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 468.

261Id.
mId. at 469.
"See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), (h) andfor (i).
'Eli Lilly, 23 F. Supp. at 475 (quoting U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross of Greater
Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 94, 921 (3rd Cir. 1990)).
"BId. (quoting A.T. & T. v. Winback & Conserve Program, 42 F.3d 1421, 1423 (3rd Cir.

1994)).
25Id. at 476-77.
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properly approved by the FDA." 67 The court bolstered its reasoning by
citing the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, which adopted the reasoning of Mylan in Barr Laboratories,v.
Quantum Pharmics.268 In Barr,the court reasoned package descriptions
such as "generic," "bioequivalent," and "dependable alternative" to
plaintiff's FDA-approved product, did not constitute false and misleading
implications a drug had FDA approval. 269 Relying on Mylan, the court
dismissed the claim.2 70 Likewise, the Third Circuit dismissed claims of
unfair competition relying on Third Circuit precedent, which held the
Lanham Act did not create a right of action of one American citizen
against another regarding unfair competition. 271' Accordingly, no such
right of action should exist between an American and a foreign
corporation. 272 The remaining counts of the complaint were dismissed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 73 Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.N.J.1998).

HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS
False Advertising Insufficiently Related to Medical Services
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held a surgeon's
claim of false advertising against a health maintenance organization
(HMO) did not relate sufficiently to medical services to require arbitration
2 74
as provided for in physician's contract with the HMO.
Plaintiff, an orthopedic surgeon, had a contract with defendant IMO,
to provide medical services for HMO beneficiaries. 2 75 The contract
contained a clause requiring arbitration for any claim arising out of or

267
26 1d. at 477

(quoting Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130 (4th Cir. 1993)).
'Id. at 478 (citing Barr Lab, Inc. v. Quantum Pharmics, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 4406, 1994
U.S. Dist.
269 LEXIS 2197 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1994)).
Lilly, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 478.
270
1d. at 485.

27
2

'Id. at 491.

7id.
1d. at 497.

2 73

274

Ford v. NYL Care Health Plans of the Gulf Coast, 141 F.3d 243, 245 (5th Cir. 1998).

275

1d. at 245.
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relating to the contract for medical services. 6 Because plaintiff had
become dissatisfied with defendant's advertising, he instituted an action
for false advertising. 2 n Defendants claimed the mandatory arbitration
clause in the parties' contract barred the action.2 7 The court held Texas
arbitration law governed the action.2 9 Next, the court announced the
standard used in an arbitration determination in Texas required a review
of the factual allegations in the claim, not a review of the causes of action
involved.280 According to Texas law, a claim such as the one at issue may
fall outside the scope of the arbitration clause if the action could
independently be maintained without any reference to the contract itself.21,
Because the action depended upon the manner in which the defendant
advertised its services, the court concluded all the elements necessary to
sustain an action for false advertising in this case could be proven without
2 ,2
any reference to the contract between the HMO and plaintiff
Consequently, the court found the false advertising claim fell outside the
scope of the arbitration clause and affirmed the judgment of the lower
court.283 Fordv. NYL CareHealth Plansofthe ulf C'oast., 141 F.3d243
(5th Cir.1998).

HMO Contract Frustrated by Abolition of DRGs
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held a
hospital services contract frustrated due to the abolition of governmental
hospital billing system (DRG) rates and, accordingly, ordered
modification of the parties' agreement to reflect the original pricing
formula.2 4
In 1991, plaintiff hospital entered into a "Hospital Services
Agreemenf 'with defendants U.S. Healthcare and the Health Maintenance

2761d. at 246.
27

71d.

2781d. at 247.

279Ford, 141 F. 3d. at 250.
2SDId

281d
mid. at 251.
Id. at 252.
'Unihealth v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 623, 637 (D.N.L, 1998).
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Organization of New Jersey.2 85 As part of the agreement, plaintiff was to
provide healthcare services to enrollees in defendant's HMO program in
exchange for payment.286 The agreement provided a discounted fee
payment schedule, which included a designation of prices that could be
charged for given services.287 Additionally, defendant agreed to reimburse
28
plaintiff, if the overall discount for services exceeded forty percent. 1
Plaintiff sued to recover payment, as well as prejudgment interest, for the
services it provided under the agreement.289
At the time the parties entered into their agreement a regulatory
billing system (DRG) applied to hospitals throughout New Jersey.290 The
DRG provided a flat fee that could be charged for different classes of
inpatient healthcare procedures.29' In 1993, the New Jersey legislature
abolished the DRG system.292 After the DRG regulation was abolished,
293
hospitals were free to determine charge rates for their services.
According to defendant, plaintiff s fees increased 65 percent after the
abolition of the DRG.294 Defendant contended its failure to pay plaintiff
was justified by its frustrated expectation of receiving the discounts the
DRG system had provided.295
The court held the parties originally intended to base the discounted
rates under the requirements of the DRG.296 The court continued, because
neither party had contemplated the abolition of the DRG, the change left
the parties unable to fulfill their respective terms of the agreement.297
Consequently, the court ordered the parties to base the discounted rates on
the former DRG system, so the agreement would reflect the parties'
original contractual expectations. 298 Accordingly, the court ordered
defendant to pay plaintiff $33,088.32 for its 1992 services, plus $6,2 86.22

2SId.
at 626.
2
'~id
7 "

28Id.

"IAd. at 627.
Unihealth, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 623.
2gId at 627-28.
"'Id at 628.
289

9id.

293

Id. at 628.
2mUnihealth, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 643.

9sId.

296Id.

297Id.

298Id. at 642.
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prejudgment interest. 299 Unilzealth v. United States Healthcare,Inc., 14
F. Supp. 2d 623 (D.NJ.1998).

INFORMED CONSENT
Community Standard No Longer Test in Negligence Actions
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held the same or similar community
standard is no longer the test for determining the standard of care in
negligence actions in Rhode Island. 30 The court adopted a test inquiring
whether a defendant physician used the same degree of care and skill
expected from a reasonably competent physician acting under the same
circumstances and belonging to the same class to which the defendant
physician belongs.3 °1 Next, the court held when material risks and viable
alternatives are not offered during pre-surgical counseling, there isperse
a lack of informed consent.0 2 The court also held Rhode Island law did
not limit the types or amount of damages recoverable in a negligence
action, except for those damages proximately caused by defendant's
negligence and reasonably foreseeable at the time of the alleged
negligence.3 3 Finally, the court upheld the lower court's dismissal for the
claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress due to lack of
evidence.3 4
Plaintiffs were the mother and father of an eleven-month-old child,
who underwent surgery for the removal of a tumor in her neck."" The
surgery, which was performedby defendant, apediatric surgeon, was later
found to have severed a nerve.30 6 The severed nerve led to a variety of
neurological problems.30 7 Subsequently, another pediatric surgeon
successfully reconnected the nerve and the child recovered fully. 3

'2Unihealth,14 F. Supp. 2d at 643.
'OFlanagan v. Wesselhoeft, 712 A.2d 365, 368-69 ([LT. 1998).
""Id.at 368.
312Id. at 371.

33Id.
31Id. at 372.

30Flanagan,712 A.2d at 366.
306id.
37Id. at 367.

303Id.
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Plaintiffs alleged negligence due to the severing of the nerve and lack
of informed consent.3 ' The parties stipulated, prior to the surgery,
defendant discussed no alternatives to surgery with plaintiffs. 310 The only
material risks of the surgery discussed were infection and bleeding.31' At
trial, plaintiffs attempted to use an out-of-state pediatric surgeon as an
expert witness to testify to the standard of care required. 312 However, the
lower court disallowed the expert's testimony because the expert lacked
sufficient knowledge regarding the standard of care required from a
pediatric surgeon practicing in Rhode Island.313 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island reversed, holding the correct standard of care to be
the care a reasonable practitioner in the same place as the defendant and
under the same circumstances would offer.31 4 Consequently, the court
found plaintiffs expert had incorrectly been barred.315
Next, the court considered the issue of informed consent. The lower
court granted summary judgment to defendants on the issue of informed
consent because the court believed plaintiffs' evidence could not convince
a reasonable jury plaintiffs would have chosen not to have the surgery if
they had known all the material risks.3 16 The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island reversed, holding the reason for an informed consent right of action
was to allow individuals to make informed medical decisions based upon
all potentially relevant facts.317 Therefore, the court held informed consent
did not exist, if viable alternatives and material risks are not disclosed to
the patient. 31" Finally, the court held Rhode Island law allows for all types
of damages in negligence claims.31 9 Only damages not proximately
caused by defendants or not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the
negligence may be limited. 32" Accordingly, the judgment by the lower

'9Id. at 366.
"'Flanagan, 712 A.2d at 366.
31lid.
2

3 1d. at 367.
"31Id. at 368.
314Id. at 369.
"'Flanagan,712 A.2d at 369.
316id "
317Id. at 371.

3"1
8d.
319Id

3"Flanagan,712 A.2d at 371.
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court was vacated and the case was remanded for a new trial.", Flanagan
v. Wesselhoeft, 712 A.2d 365 (RI. 1998).

INSURANCE
Insured Employee Required to File Claim Under ERISA
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held
plaintiffs insured under group insurance policies could not seek protection
under a Florida statute because their claims were preempted by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 32
From 1991 plaintiffwas covered by his employees' group insurance
policy, which provided major medical coverage.3 3 In 1996, the insured
became infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). 324 In
1997, defendant insurance company terminated plaintiffs coverage.3 2
Plaintiff sued under a state statute, which prohibited insurers from
canceling the health insurance policies of insurees because of a diagnosis
of or treatment for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).326
Defendant moved to remove the action to federal court on the basis
ERISA covered plaintiff's benefit plan.327 Defendant also moved for
dismissal because, defendant argued, ERISA preempted the plaintiff's
common law clain. 328
In considering whether ERISA preempted plaintiff's state claim, the
court relied on the language of section 514(a) of ERISA, which explicitly
provided all state laws relating to any employee benefit plan were
preempted by ERISA.329 The second issue before the court was whether
the state claim could be removed to federal court when Congress had
completely preempted state causes of action regarding benefits governed

3211d. at 372.

32Parra
v. John Alden Ins. Co., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
323
1d. at 1361.
3241d.

325Id.
32Id.
327 Parra,22 F. Supp. 2d at 1361.

329Id. at 1361-62.
3291d. at 1363.
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by an ERISA plan.3 3 ° The court held all cases seeking recovery of benefits
under an ERISA plan had to be converted into federal claims and removed
to federal court. 33 ' All civil complaints raising ERISA issues were
therefore, federal in character and had to be removed. 332 The third issue
was whether the state claim escaped preemption by virtue of the ERISA
savings clause.333 The "savings clause" provided nothing in ERISA
should preempt any state law regulating insurance, banking, or
securities. 33 The court ruled plaintiff could not seek protection under
ERISA's saving clause because plaintiffs claim was subject to complete
preemption under the civil enforcement provision of section 502(a) of
ERISA, even though this allowed insurance companies to use ERISA as
a shield to deny employees remedies they otherwise would have.335
Accordingly, the case was dismissed.336 Parrav. John Alden Life Ins.
Co., No. 98-0436-CIV-KING, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12875 (S.D. Fla.
June 30, 1998).

Administrator Abused Discretion in Denying
Insurance Coverage Under ERISA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied
defendant's summary judgment motion because defendant abused its
discretion in denying plaintiffs claim for surgery and in rescinding her
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
medical coverage
7
(ERISA).

33

In 1995 plaintiff applied for coverage for himself and his wife in an
338
employer-sponsored group medical plan underwritten by defendant.
Plaintiffs spouse underwent surgery in 1995. 339 Defendant, through one
of its subsidiaries, denied coverage because of spouse's pre-existing

33 0

1d..

331id.

332 Parra,22 F. Supp. 2d at 1363-64.
33Id. at 1364.
3341d.

Mid. at 1364-65.
3361d. at 1365.
33Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Serv. Inc., 145 F.3d 673, 681 (5th Cir. 1998).
33'Id. at 675.
3391d.
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medical condition and rescinded all her coverage.?0 Plaintiffsued in state
court, but defendant removed to federal court.3 4 ' The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendant after concluding ERISA applied
and defendant had not abused its discretion in denying the medical
3 42
claim.
The court found ERISA applied to the cause of action because the
express language in ERISA encompassed employee welfare benefit plans
provided through the purchase ofinsurance.34 ' In addition, the court noted
an ERISA plan existed, if from the surrounding circumstances a
reasonable person could ascertain the intended benefits, a class of
beneficiaries, the source of the financing, and the procedure for receiving
benefits. 344 The court held the abuse of discretion standard was the
appropriate standard ofreview for the summaryjudgment motion because
defendant was the administrator and therefore had discretion for payment
of claims.34 5 This, the court noted, created a conflict of interest because
defendant was the administrator of the plan and had complete authority to
346
decide questions of coverage.
The court held it was not limited only to the evidence available to the
plan administrator in evaluating whether the administrator abused its
discretion in denying plaintiff coverage. 47 When an administrator has
acted under an inherent conflict of interest, the court concluded it had a
duty to conduct a full and fair review of all pertinent information
reasonably available to the administrator.34 3 A reasonable inquiry, in this
case, showed plaintiff did not have a pre-existing condition justifying
denial of coverage. 349 Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of
summary judgment. ° Vega v. NationalLife Ins. Servs., Inc., 145 F.3d
673 (5th Cir. 1998).

'U'Id"
341Id.
342
Vega, 145 F.3d at 675.
3

Id. at 676
'id.
"Ild. at 677.
"Id. at 677-78.
Vega, 145 F.3d at 680.

347

34

1d.
34id.

31 Old. at 6 81.
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Emotional Injuries Not Covered by
Underinsured Motorist Policy
The Supreme Court of Washington held underinsured motorist policies
did not provide coverage for emotional injuries unrelated to physical
injuries arising from the same incidents.351
While assisting a motorist in January 1990, plaintiff, a sheriffs
deputy, and a state trooper were hit by an automobile. 352 The state trooper
later died as a result of injuries sustained in the accident. 353 Plaintiff
suffered minor physical injuries, but was diagnosed a year later with
354
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the accident.
On appeal, plaintiff successfully argued his emotional injuries were
covered under the underinsured motorist policy (UIM) because they
resulted from the same incident in which he suffered physical injuries. 5
The Washington State Legislature, the court noted, mandated UIM
coverage for insured motorists, but limited the coverage required to
damages for bodily injury.35 6 The court granted summary judgment for
plaintiff, but the Supreme Court of Washington granted defendant's
request for an appeal.357
The court found the terms of the policy were unambiguous and only
provided coverage for bodily injuries. 35 8 The court's interpretation of the
policy, it noted, was in accord with a majority ofjurisdictions, which also
held bodily injury did not include damages for emotional injuries.359 In
addition, the court found similar limitations placed on UIM coverage were
not contrary to public policy. 361 Specifically, the court held denying
coverage for purely emotional injuries was not contrary to public policy
because allowing recovery for emotional injuries was not contrary to
public policy because allowing recovery for emotional injuries would

3

SDaley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 958 P.2d 990, 998 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
SId. at 99 1.
3S3
id.
32

3 4

S 1d"

3

S11d. at 992.

36
Daley, 958
3S
57

P.2d at 992.

1d.

3SSId. at 993-94.
3
S1Id. at 994.
3

'Id. at 996-97.
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interfere with insurance companies' right to contract and because the
Washington legislature permitted UIM policies limited to bodily
injuries. 361 The court, therefore, reversed the decision of the court of
appeals. 362 Daley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 958 P.2d 990 cVash. 1998) (en
bane).

Recission of Insurance Policy After
Misrepresentations Improper
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held recission of
insurance policies in which misrepresentations had been made by insurees
were improper when policies had the ability to be altered. 63 Ordinarily,
the court noted, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
allowed insurance companies to rescind policies in which
misrepresentations had been made by insurees.36
In 1993, defendant, a co-owner and employee of HKM Machine &
Fabrication, purchased an insurance plan from plaintiff, Security Life
Insurance. 365 As an employee, defendant was required to fill out an
insurance application containing his medical history. 6 Defendant
received a discounted premium as a result of his representations of good
health.3 67 Defendant's policy did not contain any termination or recission
provisions.36S However, under the policy the premium could be altered in
order to reflect any changes in the insuree's actual condition,9 and
therefore, the insuree would ultimately pay the correct premium.
After issuing the policy, plaintiff allowed defendant to review his
policy and to correct any misrepresentations. 37 Defendant was warned his
failure to correct the application could result in the recission of the policy
agreement. 37 The defendant failed to disclose any misrepresentations he
361Daley, 958 P.2d at 996-97.
6Id. at 998.
3'5 Security Life Ins. Comp. of Am. v. Meyling, 146 F.3d 1184, 1193 (9th Cir. 1995).
34Id. at 1188.
311Id. at 1186.
35Id
357id.
'3"SecurityLife, 146 F.3d at 1186.
369id.
3

37101d. at 1187.
37"d.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol 2:639

made in the first application.372 In 1994, defendant suffered a cardiac
aneurysm, which led to a hospital stay of over three months and $670,000
in medical expenses.373 Plaintiff refused to pay defendant's claim after
discovering defendant had misrepresented his medical history in his
application.374 Plaintiff sued for the recission of the policy agreement.
Defendant, in turn, filed a counterclaim for breach of contract and bad
faith, as well as a claim under ERISA.375
The court held ERISA preempted the California Insurance Code.376
Additionally, the court held, although ERISA did not permit recission as
a remedy when misrepresentations were made in insurance contracts, the
court held recission improper in the instant case.377 The court reasoned,
because the policy contained a compensation mechanism in order to adjust
the premium to the correct amount, plaintiff was provided an adequate
remedy as a result of the bargain with defendant. 78 Thus, the court
reversed the district court's decision in favor of plaintiff.379 Security Life
Ins. Co. ofAm. v. Meyling, 146 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir.1998).

Insurance Companies Differentiation Between
Disability Types Does Not Violate ADA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does not prohibit insurance
companies from differentiating between disability types. 8 Plaintiff was
a schoolteacher employed by defendant, Fayette County Board of
Education (FCBE).38' During each year of her employment, plaintiff was
allowed to select one of several health plans for her medical coverage. 82
In 1993, plaintiff selected plan of defendant, Healthwise of Kentucky.383
372Id
3
M
Security Life, 146 F.3d. at 1187.
374Id.
3751d.
3761d. at 1188.
37Id. at 1189.
378
Security Life, 146 F.3d at 1192.
3791d. at 1193.
3ZLenox v. Healthwise ofKy., Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 1998).
"'Id. at 454.
382id
"
33id.
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Under the terms of plaintiff's health plan, organ transplants other than
3
bone marrow, kidney, liver, and cornea were excluded from coverage. I
Shortly after the plan took effect, plaintiff became pregnant.3"
During the course of her pregnancy, plaintiff developed a heart condition,
which continued to worsen after the birth of her child.326 Plaintiff's
condition eventually led to a stroke, which forced plaintiff to retire from
her employment with the FCBE.3" 7 As a recent retiree, plaintiff renewed
her coverage with defendant. 3s8 The new plan included a similar
provision, which excluded heart transplants from coverage. 3 9 On March
4, 1994, plaintiff suffered heart failure, requiring her to undergo heart
for denial of
transplant surgery.390 Defendant refused plaintiffs 39appeal
1
surgery.
transplant
the
to
coverage for costs relating
In September 1994, plaintiff sued alleging violation of the ADA by
defendant in issuing apolicy containing a discriminatory, disability-based
distinction. 392 The suit also alleged that the FCBE violated the ADA by
participating in a coverage plan that subjected plaintiffto disability-based
discrimination. 3 The court held plaintiff's claim untenable, finding the
ADA did not prohibit insurance companies from differentiating between
different disabilities because insurance companies were not public
accommodations as defined by the ADA.394 The court interpreted apublic
accommodation to be a physical place. 395 The court continued there must
be a barrier to physical access to trigger the type of ADA violations of
Therefore, the court affirmed the lower
which plaintiff complained.39
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant. 397 Lenox it
Healthwise of Kentucky, Ltd., 149 F.3d453 (6th Cir.1998).

94Id.
3"'Lenox, 149 F.3d at 454.
3
851d
3

87Id

"
"

39

S 1d. at 454-55.
39OLenox, 149 F.3d at 455.
39 11d.

392Id
393
1d.
39Id.
at 457.
5

39Lenox, 149 F.3d at 456.
396Id. at 457.

3971d.
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LABOR RELATIONS
Use of Medical Records as Evidence of
Age Discrimination Prejudicial
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held a trial
court erred by allowing the jury to consider medical evidence as evidence
of age discrimination
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
398
(ADEA).
Plaintiffwas an employee of defendant, Florida Power Company, for
eleven years prior to termination. 399 As a result of his termination,
plaintiff sued alleging a violation of the ADEA and a denial of company
medical benefits in violation of Employment Retire Income Security Act
(ERISA).4 °° Plaintiff further alleged he was terminated in retaliation for
making claims for company medical benefits.4" 1
During the trial, defendant moved to prevent plaintiff from presenting
to the jury evidence regarding medical insurance issues.40 2 The district
court granted defendant's motion to prevent the jury from considering the
ERISA claim.4 3 However, during closing arguments, plaintiffs counsel
mentioned plaintiffs claim for medical benefits and implied the claims
may have influenced plaintiffs termination because it made him a more
expensive employee. 404 The district court instructed the jury it might
consider insurance claims as evidence of age discrimination.4 5 After a
verdict for plaintiff, defendant moved for a new trial, citing the jury's
consideration of ERISA-related medical evidence as a source of
406
prejudice.
The court elucidated the distinctions between plaintiffs claims under
the ADEA and ERISA.40 7 The court stated the ADEA did not prohibit an
employer from considering the higher cost of an employee as a result of
39

Broaddus v. FloridaPower Corp., 145 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11 th Cir. 1998).

3
99Id.
4

00Id.

401

at 1285.

d.

4
02Id
403

Broaddus, 145 F.3d at 1285.
14Id. at 1286.
40
4

Sd.
06Id

4

4

07Id. at 1287.
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677

medical benefit claims as areason for termination. 3 The court continued
although ERISA might prohibit such consideration, the jury was not
entitled to consider medical benefit claims as evidence of
discrimination.4 9 For this reason, the court held the jury's consideration
ofmedical evidence was prejudicial to the defense and, therefore reversed
and remanded. 410 Broaddusv. FloridaPower Corp., 145 F.3d 1283 (11it
Cir. 1998).

MALPRACTICE
Negligent Spoilation of Evidence Not
Recognized Tort Claim
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
held the tort claim
4 11
of negligent spoiliation of evidence did not exist.
On February 14,1992, plaintiff-patient underwent mammography at
Chilton Memorial Hospital Mobile Unit (Chilton). Subsequently, several
physicians, including defendant physician Dr. Kalisher, read the
mammogram films. 41 2 On April 22, 1992, defendant concluded no
evidence of a malignancy existed.413 On July 28, 1993, plaintiff
underwent another mammography at Overlook Hospital. 4 14 On August 2,
1993, defendant physician, Dr. Fletcher (one of the physicians who
reviewed plaintiffs February mammogram films) indicated to plaintiffs
personal physician the results were inconclusive. 415 In September 1993,
41 6
plaintiff underwent a third mammography, which showed a tumor.
Plaintiffs physician speculated the size ofthe tumor indicated its probable
existence in February 1992; however, because the earlier mamograms
were no longer available for comparison, the determination ofwhether the

4

4

°Broaddus, 145 F.3d at 1287.

0id.

410

1d. at 1288.

41

'Proskev. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 712A.2d 1207,1211 (NL Super. Ct. App. Div. 199S).

412

1d. at 1208.
1d. at 1209.
41
413
4

1d.
415

1d. at 1209.
Proske,712 A.2d at 1209.

416
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tumor existed in February 1992 could not be made with reasonable
medical certainty.417
The issue before the court was whether plaintiffs could assert a claim
of negligent spoilation of evidence despite the absence of any statutes
granting a cause of action for negligent spoilation of evidence.418 The
court found no cause of action existed for negligent spoilation of evidence.
419
However, the court noted a tort for destruction of evidence did exist.
The court found five elements needed to be satisfied for a claim of
destruction of evidence. 420 First, there had to be pending or probable
litigation involving plaintiff.42 1 Second, defendant had to have knowledge
a cause of action existed or was probable. 422 Third, defendant, willfully
and possibly negligently, had to destroy evidence with the purpose of
disrupting plaintiffs case. 423 Fourth, plaintiffs case had to be disrupted by
destruction of the evidence.424 Fifth, damage to plaintiff had to be related
proximately to defendant's destructive acts.425
The court concluded plaintiff failed to satisfy the first two
elements.426 The court concluded by reiterating state law had not granted
a cause of action for negligent spoilation of evidence. 27 Therefore, the
court could recognize no such claim. 428 Accordingly, the court affirmed
the grant of summary judgment for defendants.429 Proske v. St. Barnabas
Med. Ctr., 712 A.2d 1207 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).

417

1d.

418

d. at 1210.
4191d.
20
4 1d.
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'Proske, 712 A.2d at 1210 (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313, 315
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); In Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991), cert. denied, 606 A.2d 375 (N.J. 1992)).
4"id.
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MEDICAREMIEDICAID
Medicaid Rights of Subrogation Upheld
Against Due Process Challenge
The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld a state statute giving
subrogation rights to the state Medicaid program to recover medical
expenses from beneficiaries, if the beneficiaries were awarded medical
expenses in judgments against third-party tortfeasors.4 "
Defendants were Medicaidbeneficiaries and their attorney, who after
the beneficiaries were injured due to lead poisoning, successfully sued
their landlord for damages they had sustained including medical
expenses. 431 Because the Medicaid program had paid defendant's medical
expenses, the state pursuant to statutory authority, sent a notice of
subrogation to the beneficiaries' attorney.4 32 After payment was refused,
the state instituted an action for payment. 43 3 As a defense, defendants
claimed the statute was unconstitutional because it violated their rights to
due process.434
The court considered whether due process required a notice and a
hearing before a lien could be placed on defendants' settlement.4 35 In
order to allege a violation of due process, the court held an individual had
first to prove state action and the individual was being deprived of a
significantpropertyinterest.4 36 The court held neither thebeneficiaries nor
the attorney possessed a significant property interest because the medical
expenses neverbelonged to them.4 37 The beneficiaries, upon receiving the
medical assistance, immediately assigned their rights to the state. 433The
attorney fees were deducted prior to any distribution. 439 Other than his
fees, the attorney had no interest in the settlement." 4

43

0Roberts v. Total Health Care, 709 A.2d 142, 155 (Nd. App. Ct. 1993).

431
1d. at
42

3 Id.

146.

433Id

434Id"
43
Roberts 709 A.2d at 147.
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1d.
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Id. at 147-48.
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at 148.
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Even though the court determined defendants could not claim a lack
of due process because they were not being deprived of any significant
property interest, the court continued to analyze whether the statute would
violate due process. 44' The court, in making its determination, weighed
the state interest served by the statute against the intrusion upon the
individual's rights. 442 The court concluded the state interest of preserving
funds rightfully belonging to the Medicaid program outweighed the
intrusion into an individual's property interest.443 Therefore, the court
found the statute did not violate due process by allowing subrogation
rights to the state Medicaid program." Roberts v. TotalHealth Care, 709
A.2d 142 (Md.App. Ct. 1998).

Notification of Denied Coverage Required for
Medicare Beneficiaries in IMOs
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held due process
required legible, clear notices explaining the denial of medical services to
445
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs.
Five Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in an Arizona HMO sued the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, alleging the Secretary failed to
provide adequate notice and appellate procedures for beneficiaries' denial
of medical care by HMOs. 4 6 The district court found HMOs denied
beneficiaries' due process because notices of denied medical care were
often illegible, failed to specify the reason for denial, and failed to inform
beneficiaries of an opportunity to present further evidence. 447 Thereafter,
the district court issued an injunction mandating notices be legible, clearly
state the reason for denial, and inform Medicare enrollees of all appeal
rights and procedures. 448 The Secretary appealed the injunction on several
grounds." 9

"'Id. at 150.
4421d. at 147.
"'Id. at 152.
444Id.

"'Grijalvav. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1118-19, 1123 (9th Cir. 1998).
4
"6Id. at I 118.
"71d.
"'Id. at 1119.
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Analyzing the Secretary's appeal, the court held "HMO denials of
services to Medicare beneficiaries with inadequate notice constitute
federal action." 4 0 The court noted IMOs and the federal government by
contract are engaged as joint participants, providing Medicare services,
such that the actions of HMOs may fairly be attributed to the federal
government. 451' Actions attributed to the federal government or federal
actors are subject to constitutional due process. 4' Thus, when IMOs fail
4 3
to provide adequate notice, the court reasoned IMOs deny due process.
Next, applying the balancing test of Matthews v. Eldridge,45 the
court held additional procedural protections were warranted for Medicare
enrollees because the deprivation of medical care affected a substantial
private interest, and because failure to provide adequate explanations for
denied care created a high risk of erroneous deprivation. 455 Additionally,
the court noted the Secretary failed to show added procedural protections
would result in significant additional costs. 45 6 Finally, the court concluded
the injunction's scope was not overly broad. 457 Thus, the court affirmed
a grant of summary judgment and injunctive relief to Medicare
beneficiaries. 458 Griyalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1998).

MENTAL HEALTH
Changes in Consent Decree WarrantedWhen Authority
Transferred and Treatment Approach Modified
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held changes in
two, long-standing consent decrees governing a facility for the treatment
of civilly committed sexually dangerous offenders were warranted under

4

SGrijalva, 152 F.3d at 1120.

4511d

42

id.at 1119.
at 1119-21.
'Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
4
SSGrijalVa, 152 F.3d at 1122-23 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
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459
the two-pronged test of Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail.

Accordingly, the court upheld a statute transferring sole authority to the
Department of Corrections (DOC) from joint authority
between the DOC
460
and the Department of Mental Health (DMH).
Plaintiffs, a group of civilly committed sexually dangerous persons,
resided in the Treatment Center at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute
in Bridgewater, Massachusetts. 461 In 1993, the Massachusetts legislature
passed a statute transferring exclusive jurisdiction over the treatment of
the civilly committed sexually dangerous residents to the DOC from joint
DOC/DMH jurisdiction.462
The court held the statute significantly
changed the administration of the treatment center, and therefore, the
consent decree could be changed no more than necessary to resolve the
problem of transferring authority from an entity whose chief concern was
treatment of the mentally ill to one whose chief concern was public
safety.463 The Original [Consent] Decree required that "patients at the
Treatment Center should have the least restrictive conditions necessary to
achieve the purposes of cornmitment."' 464
The appellate court then remanded the case to the district court to
consider whether the proposed revisions satisfied the second prong of
Rufo, that is, whether the proposed revisions were "suitably tailored" to
the new statute. 465 The district court found its proposed revisions satisfied
the second prong of Rufo, while the proposed modifications to the
Supplemental Decree met both prongs of Rufo.46 6 The Supplemental
Decree permitted solitary confinement and other punishments. 467 The case
again was appealed. 468 The appellate court remanded only those issues
pertaining to the Supplemental Decree, while reviewing all issues relating
to the Original Decree.469

45
ing v. Greenblatt, 149 F.3d 9, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992)).
"Old. at 22.

4'/d.

462d.
""Id. at 15.
"King, 149 F.3d at 15.
46Id.at 15.
46Id.at 14.
467Id. at 19.
46Id.at 16.
"'King, 149 F.3d at 11.
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The issue regarding the Original Decree was whether the 1993 statute
converted the facility into a "prison" by significantly altering its
mission.470 The court held the disciplinary problems that came about as
aresult of the transfer to the DOC violated neither the original Decree, nor
the Constitution.47' The Supplemental [Consent] Decree struck down
disciplinary and punishment procedures at odds with treatment regimens
of the mentally ill.4 7l Specifically, solitary confinement was to be linked
to the offense underlying the original commitment of the individual, while
sequestration was to be implemented only under unavoidable circumstances.473 The court held these procedures were legitimate to resolve
problems under the DOC, and suitably tailored to the change of

authority.474 Thus, the court upheld the transfer of authority to the
DOC.475 King v. Greenblatt,149 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1998).
NEGLIGENCE
Borrowed Servant Doctrine Inapplicable to Military
Physician in Private Hospital
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held physicians
on active duty in the United States Army, but working in private hospitals
pursuant to agreement, are not borrowed servants of the private hospital,
thus allowing claims of negligence to be asserted against the United
States.4 76
Plaintiffs were the natural parents of their deceased daughter,
Kimberly.477 In December 1992, Kimberly was admitted to the Santa
Rosa Children's Hospital (SRCH) for treatment of intestinal distress and
dehydration. 47 Defendantphysicianwas a resident affiliatedwith Brooke
Army Medical Center.479 Defendant was on pediatric surgical rotation at

470
471

1d. at 16.

d. at 19.
7id.
47Id. at 21.
74
4

4 King, 149 F.3d at 22.
47Sld.
476Statues v. United States, 139 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1998)
477Id. at 541.
478Id
479Id
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SRCH on the night Kimberly was admitted."' The rotation at SRCH was
pursuant to a Military Training Agreement, which provided military
residents be assigned to a two to three month pediatric surgical rotation at
SRCH.481 The United States military paid the residents during their
rotations at SRCH. On the night of Kimberly's admission, defendant,
while attempting to insert an intravenous catheter, perforated the lining of
Kimberly's heart causing her death.482 Plaintiffs filed a claim under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States for
negligence.483 The United States District Court for the Western District
of Texas granted summary judgment to the United States because
physician was held to be a borrowed servant of SRCH. 484
The issue before the court was whether defendant was a borrowed
servant of SRCH, thereby relieving the United States of liability for
negligence.4 5 The court held the Military Training Agreement did not
confer borrowed servant status on defendant.486 Thus, a claim of
negligence against the United States could proceed. 4 " The court began its
analysis with a review of the FTCA, which allows private tort claims
against the United States for acts committed by its employees.488 One
defense available against such claims, the court noted, is the defense of
borrowed servant.489 Under the borrowed servant doctrine, an employer
is liable for the acts of an employee assigned to the employer through
respondeat superior.490 The court narrowed the issue to whether the
employer maintained actual control of the borrowed servant, 491 and
referred to language in the Military Training Agreement (Agreement).492
The court found the language of the Agreement indicated residents
were under the supervision and control of the teaching chief, not the

480
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Starnes, 139 F.3d at 541.
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assigned hospital. 93 If the United States wanted to grant control over the
residents to the hospital, the court held there should have been an express
provision in the Agreement.494 Indicating the United States would be
liable for the negligent acts of its residents, the court reversed and
remanded thejudgment ofthe lower court.495 Starnesv. UnitedStates,139
F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1998).
PRIVILEGE
Peer Review Procedures of Non-Party
Hospitals Not Privileged
The United States District Court for the Western District of New York
required non-party hospitals to produce documents requested
by plaintiffs
4
according to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 11
Plaintiff patient filed a medical malpractice suit under the FTCA
against defendant medical center operated by the United States
government. 497 Plaintiff subpoenaed from non-party hospitals all records
concerning peer review of surgical procedures undertaken by defendant
physician at those hospitals. 49 The non-party hospitals refused to disclose
peer review9 records pertaining to defendant physician on the grounds of
49
privilege.
Acknowledging the general principle that privileges are strongly
disfavored in federal practice, the court found no peer review privilege
existed when a cause of action was brought under federal law in federal
court because a privilege for peer review materials had no historical or
statutory basis in federal law.5"' Only when a new privilege promotes
sufficiently important interests outweighing the need for probative
evidence, the court concluded, could a court grant a new privilege."' The
court found defendant's surgical practices to be relevant to the issue of his
493Id.
494Id.
4
"Id. at 543.

116Syposs v. United States, 179 F.P.D. 406,412 (W.D.N.Y. 199S).
497
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competence, 50 2 and therefore granted plaintiffs motion to compel nonparty hospitals to produce peer review materials.5 3 Syposs v. United
States, 179 F.R.D. 406 (W.D.N. Y. 1998).

Privilege Under Medical Studies Act Denied to Hospital
Records Not Created By Peer Review Committee
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District, Fourth Division, held
under the Medical Studies Act (Act) incident and situation reports
prepared prior to review by hospitals' oversight committees, as well as
hospitals' responses to oversight committees' reviews, were not
privileged. 5 4 Furthermore, the court held the same documents were not
protected by attorney-client or insurer-insured privilege." 5
In 1995, the patient was admitted to defendant hospital and placed on
a ventilator.5 0 6 Two days later, the ventilator became disconnected and
the patient lapsed into a coma. 507 As a result, the patient suffered brain
508
damage and became a non-verbal, non-responsive quadriplegic.
Plaintiff, the guardian of patient's estate, filed a medical
malpractice/products liability suit against defendant on behalf of the
patient.50 9 During discovery, defendant objected to plaintiff s request for
documents, claiming protection under the Medical Studies Act and
attorney-client privilege. 5 0l Defendant, in support of its position,
presented five affidavits attesting some of the reports were generated in
the peer review process,511 and some were prepared for the purpose of
rendering legal opinions. 12 The trial court ordered production of the

5

21d. at 412.

50

31d.

5

Chicago Trust Co. v. Cook County Hosp., 698 N.E.2d 641, 643 (111. App. Ct., 1998).

5
05Id.
5
061d.
507
1d.
508

1d.
"~Chicago
Trust, 698 N.E.2d at 643.
510
1d. at 644.
2
"I
d. at 645.
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documents.513 When defendant refused to comply, the trial court entered
an order of contempt against defendant." 4
Upon appeal, the court found the documents in were not initiated,
created, prepared or generated by the peer review committee, and thus not
protected under the Act.515 Instead, the documents were created in the
ordinary courts of the hospital's medical business, for the rendering of
legal opinions, to weight potential liability risk, or for future corrective
action by the hospital staff516 Additionally, the court found when
documents created by hospital employees were not created as clientattorney or insurer-insured communications, they did not fall within the
scope of attorney-client or insurer-insured privilege.5 1 7 Accordingly, the
ruling of the trial court was upheld.518 Chicago Trust Co. v. Cook Cty.
Hosp., 698 N.E.2d 641 (Ili. App. Ct. 1998).

PROCEDURE
Total Cost of Injunctive Relief in Excess of
$75,000 Satisfies Diversity
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held diversity jurisdiction requirements were satisfied when the total cost
of injunctive relief exceeded $75,000, even if the monetary value to any
one plaintiff could not be determined.519
On December 22, 1997, plaintiff, a user of Rezulin, filed an action
against defendant pharmaceutical company.52 Defendant manufactured
Rezulin, a pharmaceutical used in the treatment of diabetes.121 Plaintiff
alleged use of Rezulin created substantial health risks.52 Plaintiff sought
injunctive relief requiring defendant to warn users of Rezulin about the

513Id.
514Chicago Trust, 698 N.E.2d at 645.

"5'Id.
at 645.
6
" 1d "

5'1Id. at 650-51.
5"Id. at

651.
"'Katz v. Warner-Lambert Co., 9 F. Supp. 2d 363,365 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
2Id. at 363.

52Id.

'=1da
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drug's potential harms, monitor Rezulin users for side effects, and to fund
research to cure the side effects.523
The issue before the court was whether defendant satisfied the
requirements for diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 133 1,524
specifically, whether the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.525
Defendant's motion to remove the case to federal court because the
amount involved exceeded $75,000 was granted.5 26 Plaintiff moved to
remand the case back to state court by arguing the amount did not exceed
$75,000.527 The court held the putative amount
would exceed $75,000 and
528
was properly removed to federal court.
Faced with determining the monetary value of the benefit received
through injunctive relief to any one Rezulin user,5 29 the court concluded
the cost of burdening defendant with the requirements of the injunctive
relief would undoubtedly cost more than $75,000 given the scope of the
research required under the injunction.5 30 In addition, the court also
concluded even if Rezulin users partially funded the research, the final
costs to defendant in implementing the requirements of the injunction
would exceed $75,000. 531 Accordingly the court held the case was
properly removed to federal court. 532 Katz v. Warner-Lambert Co., 9 F.
Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y 1998).

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Massachusetts Adopts Hindsight Approach
in Duty to Warn Cases
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held a hindsight approach
applied to the implied warrant of merchantability in finding a
s23Id.
524

5

Katz, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 363.

25Id.

5261d.
5271d.
52S

Id

29

S Katz,
53

Old.

s31Id"
s32Id.

9 F. Supp. 2d at 363.
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manufacturer of silicone gel implants liable for damages resulting from
the rupture of an implant. 33
In 1977, plaintiff underwent surgery in which she had silicone gel
breast implants, manufactured by Heyer-Schultz in 1976, implanted. 4
After experiencing chest pain in 1992, plaintiff had a mammogram. 35
The results of the mammogram revealed the implants had ruptured and
leaked.536 The silicone gel implants were subsequently removed in
1993. 537 As a result of the release of silicone gel into plaintiff's body,
plaintiff suffered several medical ailments including permanent scarring
of her pectoral muscles and an auto-immune disease."38
The court upheld the lower court's ruling, which found the implants
were negligently designed and accompanied by a negligent product
warning. 539 The court announced its decision would revise Massachusetts
law regarding duty to warn in products liability cases." Massachusetts
would now apply a retrospective application or "hindsight approach" to
the implied warranty ofmerchantability. 541 The announced purpose of the
court's revision was to bring Massachusetts in line with the majority of
jurisdictions, as well as the RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS, and to
reconcile inconsistencies in the application of Massachusetts law. 42
Accordingly, a defendant would not be liable under implied warranty of
merchantability for failing to warn about risks not foreseeable at the time
of the sale or which could not have been reasonably discovered through
testing.543 The court affirmed the Superior Court decision, which held
defendant liable for damages resulting from a ruptured silicone breast
implant. Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass.
1998).

"'Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 924 (Mass. 1993).
534

1d. at 912.

"51d.
536Id.
537Id
nSVassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 912-13.
53Id. at 912.

'4'Id.
m'Id. at 922.
M2Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 922.
43Id. at 923-24.
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REFUSAL OF TREATMENT
ERISA Preempts Negligence Claims Based on Improper
Denial of Pre-authorization for Medical Treatment
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held
negligence claims based upon a refusal to grant pre-authorization by a
third-party administrator were preempted by ERISA. 4
Plaintiffalleged negligent medical treatment and improper processing
of benefit claims after being severely disfigured following an attempted
suicide by self-immolation. 45 Plaintiffs health insurance plan was
obtained through her spouse's employer and had a pre-authorization
clause for psychiatric hospitalization. 546 Plaintiff had been diagnosed at
the age of seventeen with bipolar disorder and had previously been
successfully treated at McLean Hospital (McClean). 47 On September21,
1994, plaintiff was diagnosed as acutely psychotic and sought
hospitalization at McClean.5 48 However, defendant Private Healthcare
Systems, a third-party administrator responsible for utilization review and
pre-authorization, denied plaintiffs request to be hospitalized at McClean
and instead, authorized hospitalization at two other facilities. 54 9 Plaintiffs
condition worsened after hospitalization at one of the pre-authorized
facilities. 50
Plaintiff sued seeking compensatory damages for loss of
consortium.55 1 Defendants claimed ERISA preempted state law claims
and sought dismissal in district court.552 Plaintiffs argued ERISA
preemption was inappropriate because the claims did not relate to an
employee benefit plan under ERISA.55 ' Defendant's decision, plaintiff
contended, went beyond the scope of ordinary utilization review and

5

4Danca v. Emerson Hosp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32 (D. Mass. 1998).
55Id. at 30.
46Id.
547

Id.

548

1d.

549

Danca, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 30.

ssod.
551

1d.
ss2Id.

ss3Id
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amounted to participation in medical treatment decisions.5 4 The court
found the argument irrelevant because claims for negligent treatment
decisions would also be pre-empted by ERISA.555 The court however
noted, had plaintiffs sought relief before the injury occurred, the court
would have had the authority to provide prospective relief for benefits
allegedly due under the plan, if there were an imminent threat to health or
life.5 5 6 Because plaintiffs claims related to an ERISA plan, the court
found the claims preempted by ERISA.5 7 Accordingly, defendant's
motions to dismiss were allowed. 558 Dancav. Emerson Hosp., 9 F. Stipp.
2d27 (D.Mass 1998).

REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
Statute Banning Partial-Birth
Abortion Unconstitutional
The United States District Court for the Southern District ofIowa granted
plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction to enjoin an Iowa statute
banning partial-birth abortions because the court held the Iowa statute was
vague and unduly burdened a woman's constitutional right to an
abortion.?"
The Iowa statute banning partial-birth abortions prohibited a person
from knowingly performing or attempting to perform a partial-birth
abortion. 5 60 The statute defined a partial-birth abortion as "an abortion in
which aperson partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the
fetus and completing the delivery. '5 6' A violation of the statute was a

SS4Danca, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 30.
55SId.

S6Id.
at 31.
SId
"'Id. at 32.

...Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa v. Miller, I F. Supp. 2d 958,963 (S.D. Iowa 1998).
s Id. at 961 (citing 1998 Iowa Legis. Ser. 2073 (West) to be codified at IOWA CoDE

§

707.8A (1998)).
"'Id. (citing 1998 Iowa Legis. Serv. 2073 (West) to be codified at IOWA CODE § 707.IC

(1998)).
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class C felony, mandating a maximum ten-year prison sentence and a fine
of $500 to $10,000.562

The court held the statute vague because the prohibitions of the
statute were not clearly defined thereby inhibiting the exercise of a
constitutionally protected right.563 The court accepted plaintiffs argument
because the medical community did not recognize the term partial-birth
abortion the statute's language could lead to the prohibition of other types
of abortions.5 6 Specifically, the court noted the statute was unclear in
defining a "living fetus" and in whether partial vaginal delivery meant
delivering an intact fetus or part of a fragmented fetus. 65 The court held
the statute constituted an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion
as protected under the United States Constitution because the language of
the statute was broad enough to encompass all pre-viability abortion
procedures. 66 The court concluded the statute would likely be invalid
and unconstitutional.5 67 Accordingly, the court granted the preliminary
injunction. 68 PlannedParenthoodof GreaterIowa, Inc. v. Miller, 1 F.
Supp. 2d 958 (S. D. Iowa 1998).

Hospitalization for Abortions After First
Trimester, Informed Consent, and
Two-Day Waiting Period Constitutional
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee upheld several abortion regulations,
including hospitalization for abortions after the first trimester, informed
consent, and a two-day waiting period. 569 The court invalidated
emergency medical exceptions
to the regulations because it found such
57 0
narrow.
too
exceptions

5621d"
.63Id. at 962.
'"PlannedParenthood,1 F. Supp. 2d at 962.

5651d.

S6Id. at 963.
56 Id.

SId at 964.

"69PIanned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, No. 01 A01-9601 -CV-00052, 1998
WL 467110, at * 47-48 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1998), reh'g denied (Sept. 2, 1998).
570id .
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The court first noted it would review the statutes' unambiguous
" ' Next, the court noted, under
language, as intended by the legislature.57
an individual's right to privacy, the Constitution of Tennessee protected
both a woman's right to procreate and her right to avoid procreation.'
Adopting the undue burden standard of PlannedParenthoodv. Casey); 73
the court reviewed the challenged provisions. 4 The court concluded
requiring hospitalization for abortions performed after the first trimester,
but before viability, was constitutional.5 75 Additionally, the court noted
outright abortions could be performed in physicians' offices or outpatient
clinics. 5 7 6 Hospitalization did not amount to an undue burden, because
hospitalization, the court reasoned, promoted enhanced safety in the case
of complications due to late term abortions.r" Informed consent from the
treating physician did not constitute an undue burden, but rather ensured
counseling regarding the profound significance of a woman's decision to
have an abortion.17 ' Also, the court found no factual basis suggested a
two-day waiting period79before an abortion unduly burdened a woman's
5
procreative autonomy.
The court did hold the emergency medical exceptions to the abortion
regulations unconstitutional.5"' The court noted exceptions to the abortion
regulations were restricted to life-threatening and serious healththreatening conditions. 58' Tennessee only excepted life-threatening
conditions; thus, the exceptions were too narrow creating an undue burden
on a woman's right to procreational autonomys n Finally, the court noted
the waiting period and counseling by the treating physician taken together
created an undue burden on the staff of abortion clinics, creating undue
delay in obtaining an abortion.5 83 The court mandated neither regulation

57'1d, at *8-9.
srId.at *8.

S'nSundquist,1998WL 467110 at *23 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833

(1992)).
-741d. at *23-24. (See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78).
- Id. at *2S.
576Id.
s'ld,at *29-32passim.

"Sundquist, 1998 WL 467110 at *32-34.
s79Id at *41-46.
sOId. at *47-48.
"'Id. at *47.
52Id. at *48.
50Id. at *48-50.
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be enforced until the legislature determined which was more important.5 84
The case was remanded for further consideration consistent with the
opinion.585 PlannedParenthood
ofMiddle Tenn. v. Sundquist,No. OA019601-CV-00052, 1998 WL 467110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1998), reh 'g
denied (Sept. 2, 1998).

Mandatory Consultation, 24-Hour Delay,

Parental Consent For Minors Before
Abortion Constitutional
The Supreme Court of Mississippi held the Mississippi State
Constitution's (Constitution) right to privacy included the implied right
to obtain an abortion.58 6 The court further held mandatory consultation,
twenty-four-hour delay, and parental consent for minors did not create
undue burdens, and were therefore constitutional. 87
Physicians, health clinics, and organizations dedicated to
reproductive rights challenged the constitutionality ofMississippi abortion
laws. 88 Plaintiffs alleged the regulations violated the Constitution's rights
to privacy, bodily integrity, due process, and freedom from governmental
interference in medical decisions. 89 The chancery court found the
Constitution contained a specific right to abortion and the restrictions were
constitutional. 90 Plaintiffs appealed.591
Addressing arguments the Constitution did not protect a right to
abortion because abortion was illegal at the time of drafting, the court
rejected the State's interpretation the framers intended to preclude
protection of abortion. 92 The court held because abortion was only illegal
after quickening, the State's argument was meritless. 5 93 Additionally, the
court concluded, even though abortion was not explicitly mentioned in the

5

1Sundquist, 1998 WL 467110 at *48-50.

585
d"
S867Pro-Choice

Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645, 654 (Miss. 1998).
s1Id at 655-60passim.
s88Id. at 648-49.
s89Id. at 649.
S9'Fordice,716 So. 2d at 649.
s2Id.
at 650-5 1.
593
1d.
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Constitution, there was no more sacred right than the right of each
individual to the possession and control of his own person. 94 The court
concluded the right of autonomous bodily integrity and5a95penumbra of the
right to privacy protected an implicit right to abortion.
Before reviewing the abortion regulations' constitutionality, the court
noted previous decisions regarding the right of privacy applied strict
scrutiny.596 However, because ofthe complex rights ofawoman's privacy
and the rights of unborn life, the court decided a different standard was
appropriate.597 The court adopted the Caseyundue burden test, which held
a restriction on abortion is constitutional, if it is legitimate and does not
create an undue burden. 9 Analyzing plaintiffs' claims, the court held
mandatory consultation and twenty-four-hour delay ensures a woman has
given thoughtful consideration in deciding to have an abortion.5'" Such
a legitimate purpose did not amount to an undue burden and was therefore
constitutional.6
Lastly, the court held parents could provide the
emotional and moral support a minor needed in deciding to have an
abortion. 6°1 Thus, the parental consent restriction, which included a
judicial bypass, did not amount to an undue burden and was
constitutional. 6 2 Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision ofthe lower
court.6 3 Pro-ChoiceMississippiv. Fordice,716 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1998).

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Statute of Limitations Bars Plaintiff's Claim
Against Tobacco Defendant
The Court of Appeals of Florida, First District, held the statute of
limitations barred plaintiffs claim of product liability against defendant
5

'Id. at 653 (quoting In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1039 (Miss. 1985)).

S95Id.
5

5 6Fordice, 716

'id.

So. 2d at 655.

59SId
9Id. at 656.
6Id.
60
Fordice,716 So. 2d at 660.
('Id.at 666.
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tobacco company.6 4 The court also held claims regarding labeling
practices were preempted by the 1965 Federal Labeling Act, thereby
barring plaintiffs claim regarding defendant's labeling practices. 605 The
court held the admissibility claims raised at trial, but never addressed
within the complaint regarding Brown & Williamson should have been
barred from trial, but was not reversible error. 6 Finally, the court held
speculative testimony by two plaintiffs witnesses, while erroneously
admitted, was not reversible error. 7
Plaintiffbegan smoking in 1947 and continued until January 1991.618
Plaintiff smoked Lucky Strikes, a product of the American Tobacco
Company (ATC), which was later transferred to Brown & Williamson.0 9
On January 29, 1991, plaintiff began coughing blood.6 10 Plaintiff
immediately notified his physician, who saw him on February 4, 1991.611
On February 14, 1991, a pulmonary specialist confirmed the diagnosis of
lung cancer. 612
Regarding the first issue, the court based its ruling on the point at
which plaintiff had or should have had notice of the relationship between
his injury and defendant's product. 6 " The court found plaintiff had
discovered his medical condition on February 4, 1991, when he coughed
and spitted blood. 4 Plaintiff's assertion discovery of the injury resulting
from defendant's acts should be left to ajury was dismissed because the
court found a jury could have reasonably concluded plaintiff was aware
of his injury on that date. 615 In addition, the court noted plaintiff filed his
61 6
claim on February 10, 1995, four years after the date of discovery.
Therefore, the statute of limitations had expired barring plaintiffs claim.6 17

6Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 723 So. 2d 833, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (per curiam), reh 'g denied 1998 WL 906838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1998).

'Id.
WId.
6 8Id. at 834.
'Brown & Williamson, 723 So. 2d at 834.
610
Id at 835.
6
11

612

1d.

Id.

613

1d. at 836.

64
" Brown
6

& Williamson,723 So. 2d at 836.
'sld. at 835 (citing Copeland v. Armstrong Cork Co., 447 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1984)).
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id.
617

Id. at 836-37.
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The holding regarding the second issue was based upon the 1969
Federal Labeling Act (Act), which preempted state labeling laws and
subsequently barred claims based upon labeling practices.618 Plaintiff
contended the Act's reference to "advertising or promotional materials"
did not apply to the label on cigarette packages. 619 However, the court
held prior case law interpreted the statute clearly to pertain to all "forms
of communication directed to a mass market." 620 The label issue asserted
by plaintiff raised post-1969 federal labeling act questions; therefore, the
court held plaintiffs assertion about labeling practices
could not be
621
preemption.
act
labeling
addressed due to federal
The third issue before the court was whether documents presented at
trial by plaintiff regarding trade practices by defendant amounted to an
unpleaded claim against defendant independently, not as "successor to
ATC."6r In resolving the issue, the court focused on the substance of the
documents indicating defendant's failure to disclose important research
information to the United States Surgeon General.6( 3 The court found the
information irrelevant to common trade knowledge ofthe tobacco industry
as a whole. Therefore, the court held, while it was inappropriate to allow
4
the admission at trial of the documents, it was not reversible error.62
The fourth issue before the court involved speculative testimony by
plaintiff and plaintiffs witness. 62s The court noted, as a general rule,
speculative testimony was not reversible error,626 but the court found the
particular testimony in question insignificant.627 Accordingly, the court
reversed judgment for plaintiffs. 628 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
v. Carter,723 So. 2d 833 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (percuriam), reh g
denied 1998 WL 906838 (Fla.Dist Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1998).

6

Md (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)).

6 19

1d. at 837.
"Brown & Williamson, 723 So.2d at 837 (citing Griesenbeck v. American Tob2cco Co.,

897 F. Supp. 815 (D.N.J. 1995)).

62Id.

62Id
62'id.
6 4Id.
'SBrown & Williamson, 723 So. 2d at 838.

6Id.
67Id.

"Id.
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TORTS
Release of Patient's Medical Records
Not Invasion of Privacy or
Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Court of Appeals of Missouri granted plaintiff hospital's motion for
summary judgment against defendant patient's counterclaim for invasion
of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.629
Plaintiff sued defendant patient for unpaid charges.63 ° Defendant
filed a counterclaim for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress because
plaintiff released defendant's medical records to defendant's former
" ' The court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on
spouse.63
the invasion of privacy claim because defendant failed to prove his
estranged spouse unreasonably obtained information about his private
subject matter.632 The records at issue dealt with defendant's psychiatric
admission while at plaintiff hospital.633 Defendant's spouse subpoenaed
them in the course of divorce proceedings. 634 The court granted summary
judgment in favor of plaintiff on the claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress because plaintiff s conduct in releasing the records was
not so extreme and outrageous as to exceed the possible bounds of
decency. 635 At most, the court observed, plaintiff's conduct amounted to
636
an oversight.
The court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on the
claim ofnegligent infliction of emotional distress because defendant failed
to establish his distress was medically diagnosable or of sufficient severity
to be medically significant. 637 Defendant only asserted he suffered

611St. Anthony's Med. Ctr. v. H.S.H., 974 S.W.2d 606, 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
63
at 608
63Od.
1

Md

632

Id.

633

6

1d.

'St. Anthony's, 974 S.W.2d at 608.
63
at 611.
63s1d.
6

Id.

637

1d. at 612-13.
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humiliation, shame, and severe emotional distress. 63s Accordingly, the
court affirmed the trial court's judgment and dismissed the case with
prejudice.63 9 St. Anthony's Med. Ctr. v. H.S.H., 974 S.WY.2d 606 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998).

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Benefits Denial Upheld Against Veteran Who
Participated in LSD Treatment
The United States Court of Veterans' Appeals found plaintiffs current
medical condition, including schizophrenia, was not aggravated or caused
by LSD treatment in the Veterans' Administration (VA) medical
system.w
In May 1966, plaintiff, a veteran who had served in the United States
Army from 1953 to 1955, was admitted to a VA hospital for reactive
depression with severe anxiety, mild hysterical features, excessive denial,
and borderline intelligence. 6" In October 1967 plaintiff consented to
participate in an investigational study of the drug lysergic acid
diethylamide (LSD-25). 6" After one session, plaintiff withdrew from the
study and left the hospital against medical advice. 64' Plaintiffretumed to
a VA hospital in 1981 for medical care.6 At that time plaintiff was
diagnosed with "organic brain syndrome-Temporal lobe disorder-?
Probably cerebral cortical atrophy." " As a result of his condition,
65
plaintiff was found to be disabled for purposes of employment.
In May 1983 plaintiff submitted a claim for benefits to the VA
alleging his current condition was attributable to the LSD-25 treatment.rc7
In connection with plaintiff's claim, a physician reviewed plaintiff's

"Id. at 613.
3
"St. Anthony's, 974 S.W.2d at 613.
" Boggs v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, IIVet. App. 334,345 (Vet. App. 1998).
6 3
1d. at 336.
A2Id.
43Id.

6
"Id
6

"Boggs, 11 Vet. App. at 336.

"BId.
6471d.

at 336-37.
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medical records and concluded plaintiff was suffering from conditions
relating to both alcohol abuse and LSD treatment. 48 Plaintiff reopened
the current claim in 1993 after the Board of Veterans' Appeals denied
connection
multiple claims for benefits because it found no causal 649
between the LSD treatment and plaintiffs current condition.
The court found the Board did not commit any error in denying
plaintiff s claim or by refusing to accept medical opinions from plaintiff
unsupported by medical evidence. 650 The court found plaintiff was not
entitled to de novo review of his claim denial because a change 6in
5
regulations since his previous denial did not apply to the VA claim. 1
The Board, therefore, erred by failing to require new material evidence to
reopen the claim, but the court held the error was harmless because the
Board treated the Veteran's appeal as a new claim.652 Additionally, the
court found the Board did not commit error by giving more credibility to
one examiner over another.653 Therefore, the court affirmed the Board's
denial of benefits. 6 4 Boggs v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 11 Vet. App.
334 (Yet. App. 1998).

Employee Injured in Common Area of Building
Has Claim Against Employer
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held employees injured in common
areas of buildings have compensable workers' compensation claims
against5 their employers, if the employer exhibits control of the common
65
area.
In 1985, defendant garment manufacturer hired plaintiff employee as
a fabric presser.656 Defendant's business was located on the fourth floor

64

1d. at 337.

"Id. at 338.

65

Boggs, 11 Vet. App. at 340 (discussing Black v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 177 (1993); Swann

v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229 (1993); Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458 (1993); Guimond v. Brown,
6 Vet. App. 69 (1993)).
6"Id.
at 342.
2
6S
Id. at 343.
"3Id. at 344.
6'4Id. at 345.
6"Ramos v. M & F Fashions, Inc., 154 A.2d 486, 494 (N.J. 1998).

6'61d at 489.
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of a five-story building in Newark, New Jersey. 5 7 The building's elevator
serviced the entire building, including defendant's business. Many people
avoided the elevator, which plaintiff attributed to the elevator's door
remaining open during use.65 8 However, plaintiff used the building's
elevator routinely in the course of his employment, including his arrival
and departure from the building.6 9 Although plaintiffwas not required to
begin work until 8:00 a.m., he typically arrived each day at 7:00 a.m.(, -3
Plaintiff's superiors knew of his habit of66 arriving early, which they
commented made him their best employee. 1
On May 13, 1988, upon arriving early to work, plaintiff entered the
elevator and fell approximately eight to ten feet down the elevator shaft. 62Plaintiff was severely injured as a result of his fall and was unable to
work.663 Plaintiff filed an action against the landlord of the building, as
well as aworkers' compensation claim.6 Defendant went out of business
shortly after the accident, and therefore did not defend plaintiffs workers'
compensation claim. 66' However, the Second Injury Fund (SIF) opposed
plaintiff's claim for benefits.66
At the hearings, plaintiffs expert witnesses testified plaintiff was
permanently disabled as a result of the accident.667 The compensation
court determined plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled in the
course of employment, and was therefore entitled to benefits. 3 The
Appellate Division reversed.66 9 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
determined defendant controlled the elevator because it was used during
the course of business. 670 The court held the evidence established the
employer used the elevator for its business purposes, which implied the
employer could authorize its use for other purposes such as coming to and

67Id.

65rd.
6

r"Ramos, 154 A.2d at 489.
65ld"
612Id.
"'Id.
1154Id.

6Ramos, 154 A.2d at 489.
65
1d.
Id. at 489-90.
691d. at 490.

670Id. at 491.
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from work.67 ' Therefore, because the plaintiff was permanently disabled
672
within the premises of his employer, he was entitled to compensation.
Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court's award ofbenefits. 673 Ramos
v. M. & F. Fashions, 154 A.2d (N.J. 1998).

CORRECTION
In PregnantMother's Right to Refuse TreatmentBeneficial to Her Fetus: Refusing Blood
Transfusions by James A. Filkins, M.D., which appeared in Vol. 2, No. 2, an editorial error
resulted in a misstatement of a court's ruling. The second full paragraph on page 363 of
Dr. Filkins's article should have read: "In re FetusBrown represents a court's use of such a
balancing test. The Appellate Court of Illinois, First Division, determined the state's
interest in the well-being of a viable fetus did not outweigh the patient's right to refuse
medical treatment for religious reasons. (citations omitted)." The DEPAUL JOURNAL OF
HEALTH CARE LAWv apologizes to Dr. Filkins for the error.

67

Id. at 494.

6Id.

